## Facts

- A 101-acre family farm in Dutchess County was devised to Thomas G. Hahn, Jr. as a qualified life tenant with exclusive possession while he continued farming; the life estate ended upon his death or cessation of farming.
- The remainder interest was devised to the four siblings (including Hahn, Jeanne Halstead, Barbara Butts, and Johanne Hagar) in equal shares as tenants in common, subject to the life estate.
- Three siblings sought to preserve the farm’s agricultural character by selling the farm’s “development rights” (or, alternatively, a conservation easement) to impose permanent limits on future development density.
- Hagar opposed any permanent restriction on development and objected to selling development rights or a conservation easement.
- Plaintiffs sued under RPAPL 1602 seeking judicial authorization to sell the development rights and a declaration that development rights are “real property, or a part thereof,” within the statute.
- After discovery, the case was submitted for non-jury determination on stipulated facts.
- The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding development rights were not “real property” under RPAPL 1602.
- Plaintiffs appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether development rights constitute “real property, or a part thereof” within the meaning of RPAPL 1602.
2. If so, whether plaintiffs proved entitlement to an order authorizing the sale of development rights under RPAPL 1602, given the life estate and the interests of all remaindermen.

## Decision

- The Appellate Division held that development rights constitute “real property” (or a part thereof) for purposes of RPAPL 1602 because they are a severable, conveyable interest in land.
- The court nevertheless affirmed dismissal of the action because plaintiffs failed to satisfy RPAPL 1602’s substantive prerequisites for court-authorized disposition.
- The court rejected the view that the stated conservation objective, standing alone, justified overriding the objecting remainderman’s interest in preserving the property’s future development potential.

## Legal Principles

- For RPAPL 1602, “real property” includes estates and interests in land, not only the physical parcel; a conveyable interest such as development rights can qualify.
- Even when the interest to be conveyed is “real property,” RPAPL 1602 requires a sufficient showing that the proposed disposition is warranted under the statute, considering the interests of all present and future interest holders.
- A life tenant’s possessory control does not, without statutory satisfaction and appropriate proof, permit permanent encumbrances that materially affect remaindermen’s interests over an objecting remainderman’s opposition.

## Conclusion

The court recognized development rights as an interest in real property cognizable under RPAPL 1602, but denied authorization to sell those rights because the proponents did not make the required statutory showing to justify a court-ordered disposition against an objecting co-remainderman.


Hahn v. Hagar, 153 A.D.3d 105 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2017)