## Facts

- After 10 p.m. on a rural road, Holly Hain was struck and killed by a vehicle driven by a Jamison defendant.
- Plaintiff alleged the decedent was in the roadway assisting a loose calf that had escaped from a nearby enclosure owned by Drumm Family Farm, Inc.
- Plaintiff alleged the Jamison driver was negligent in operating the vehicle and the Farm was negligent in failing to maintain fencing and restrain or retrieve the calf.
- Deposition testimony described the driver slowing for a curve, being affected by bright headlights from a stopped vehicle, and seeing the decedent only moments before impact; the driver initially thought the animal was a dog but later learned it was a calf.

## Issues

1. Whether the Farm, on summary judgment, established as a matter of law that any negligence in allowing the calf to escape or failing to retrieve it was not a proximate cause of the decedent’s death, such that intervening acts severed causation.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division.
- The Farm was not entitled to summary judgment because material fact questions existed on whether the Farm’s alleged negligence was a proximate cause of the death.
- The Jamison defendants’ cross-claim for contribution against the Farm was reinstated, and the matter was remitted for further proceedings.

## Legal Principles

- Proximate cause and foreseeability are generally for the factfinder; they may be decided as a matter of law only when the facts permit a single conclusion.
- A summary-judgment movant must affirmatively show the absence of any material fact issue, including by demonstrating its conduct was not a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.
- An intervening act severs causation only if it is extraordinary under the circumstances, not foreseeable in the normal course of events, or independent of and far removed from the defendant’s conduct.
- Where alleged negligence creates a specific roadway hazard (a loose farm animal), it can be foreseeable that motorists or bystanders will respond to that hazard; resulting injuries may remain within the scope of risk for proximate-cause purposes.

## Conclusion

Because a jury could find it foreseeable that a person would attempt to assist or remove a loose calf from a dark rural roadway and that the Farm’s alleged negligence was a substantial factor in the fatal sequence of events, proximate cause could not be negated as a matter of law on summary judgment.


Hain v. Jamison, 28 N.Y.3d 524 (N.Y. 2016)