Facts
- Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni national alleged to have served as Osama bin Laden’s chauffeur, was captured in Afghanistan in 2001 and transferred to Guantánamo Bay in 2002.
- The President directed creation of military commissions to try certain detainees; Hamdan was designated for trial before such a commission.
- Hamdan was charged with conspiracy to commit offenses triable by military commission.
- Hamdan filed habeas corpus and mandamus petitions challenging the commission’s authority and procedures under domestic military law and the law of war.
- The district court stayed the commission and granted relief, concluding the commission violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, including by permitting proceedings and evidence to be withheld from the accused.
- The D.C. Circuit reversed, concluding the commissions were authorized and that the Geneva Conventions were not judicially enforceable in this setting.
- The Supreme Court granted review, including whether the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) withdrew jurisdiction over pending habeas cases and whether the commission complied with the UCMJ and the law of war.
Issues
- Whether the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 stripped federal courts of jurisdiction over habeas petitions pending when the Act was enacted.
- Whether the President’s military commission system was authorized by the AUMF, the UCMJ, or the President’s inherent authority.
- Whether the commission’s structure and procedures complied with UCMJ requirements, including procedural uniformity with courts-martial where practicable.
- Whether Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applied and, if so, whether its minimum trial guarantees constrained the commission in a manner enforceable in habeas.
Decision
- The Court held it retained jurisdiction because the DTA did not clearly apply its jurisdiction-limiting provisions to pending cases.
- The Court held the challenged commission was not expressly authorized by Congress or inherent executive power in the form used.
- The Court held the commission was required to comply with the UCMJ and the law of war and that it did not.
- The Court concluded the commission’s departures from courts-martial procedures were not shown to be impracticable and therefore violated UCMJ Article 36.
- The Court held Common Article 3 applied to the conflict with al Qaeda and required trial by a “regularly constituted court” providing indispensable judicial guarantees.
- The Court held the commission’s procedures—including exclusion of the accused and use of evidence not fully disclosed—failed Common Article 3’s minimum requirements and thus were unlawful.
Legal Principles
- Jurisdiction-stripping statutes are not applied to pending cases absent clear congressional direction.
- Military commissions convened by the Executive must be authorized by statute or fall within limits recognized by the UCMJ and the law of war.
- UCMJ Article 21 preserves military commission jurisdiction only for offenses triable by statute or by the law of war; the law of war operates as a constraint on commission authority.
- UCMJ Article 36 requires commission procedures to be uniform with courts-martial “insofar as practicable”; significant deviations require a demonstrated showing of impracticability.
- Common Article 3 applies to non-international armed conflicts and requires adjudication by a “regularly constituted court” providing judicial guarantees recognized as indispensable.
- When statutory military law incorporates law-of-war norms, violations of those norms are cognizable in habeas review.
Conclusion
The Court invalidated the Guantánamo military commission convened to try Hamdan, holding that pending habeas jurisdiction was not withdrawn by the DTA and that the commission, as structured and operated, lacked sufficient authorization and violated both UCMJ procedural requirements and Common Article 3’s minimum guarantees.