## Facts

- Jon H. Hammer owned a purebred Brittany Spaniel with a natural 10-inch tail.
- The American Brittany Club (ABC) promulgated a Brittany breed standard used in American Kennel Club (AKC)-sanctioned competitions.
- The Brittany standard stated that the breed should be “\[t\]ailless to approximately four inches, natural or docked,” and that any tail “substantially more than four inches shall be severely penalized.”
- A tail longer than four inches did not disqualify a dog from competition but could result in a significant judging penalty.
- Hammer wished to compete without penalty but refused to dock his dog’s tail, alleging docking is cruel.
- Hammer alleged the standard encouraged animal cruelty in violation of New York Agriculture and Markets Law § 353 and effectively excluded him from meaningful competition participation.
- He sought declaratory relief that the standard violated § 353 and an injunction barring defendants from using the standard in judging.

## Issues

1. Whether New York Agriculture and Markets Law § 353 implies a private right of action permitting a dog owner to seek declaratory and injunctive relief against private organizations for using a breed standard that allegedly encourages tail docking.
2. Whether implying such a private remedy would be consistent with the Legislature’s enforcement scheme for a penal animal-cruelty statute.

## Decision

- The New York Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the complaint.
- The court held § 353 does not imply a private right of action for Hammer’s requested civil relief.
- The court concluded that implying a private remedy would be inconsistent with the statutory and legislative enforcement scheme.
- The court did not decide whether tail docking violates § 353, because the lack of a private right of action was dispositive.

## Legal Principles

- A private right of action may be implied from a statute only if: (1) the plaintiff is within the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted; (2) a private remedy would promote the legislative purpose; and (3) a private remedy would be consistent with the legislative scheme.
- Consistency with the legislative scheme is decisive when the statute is penal and the Legislature has assigned enforcement primarily to public authorities rather than private litigants.
- Courts will not convert a criminal prohibition into a private civil enforcement mechanism absent a legislative indication that such a remedy was intended.

## Conclusion

The court held that New York’s animal-cruelty statute (§ 353) provides public, penal enforcement and does not authorize private litigants to obtain injunctive or declaratory relief challenging private breed standards that allegedly encourage tail docking.


Hammer v. Am. Kennel Club, 1 N.Y.3d 294, 803 N.E.2d 766 (N.Y. 2003)