## Facts

- Consumers purchased a new refrigerator from a retailer.
- Upon delivery, the refrigerator had a dent, and the buyers claimed they received a damaged product.
- The buyers sued under state and federal consumer-warranty law, including the Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act (also referenced as the Consumer Products Warranties Act).
- During the dispute, the buyers indicated a willingness to resolve the matter for $900 in damages plus $750 in attorney’s fees.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for the buyers on liability under the warranty statute.
- The buyers’ counsel sought $2,825 in attorney’s fees, primarily based on time spent litigating the matter.
- The trial court awarded $900 in damages and $450 in attorney’s fees.
- The buyers appealed only the attorney’s fee award, arguing the court misread the statute and improperly reduced the fee.

## Issues

1. Whether the Magnuson–Moss attorney-fee provision requires the trial court to award fees strictly according to actual time expended by counsel once the consumer prevails.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by awarding $450 in attorney’s fees rather than the $2,825 requested.

## Decision

- The appellate court affirmed the judgment, including the $450 fee award.
- The court held the statute requires the trial court to make a determination on fees but leaves the amount (and even whether fees should be awarded) to the court’s discretion.
- The phrase authorizing fees “based on actual time expended” was treated as permissive, not a mandatory lodestar directive.
- Applying a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, the court found no clear abuse in reducing the requested fee.
- The trial court’s reduced fee was upheld as reasonable in light of the modest consumer dispute and the circumstances surrounding the litigation and settlement posture.

## Legal Principles

- Under the Magnuson–Moss fee-shifting provision, a prevailing consumer may recover costs and attorney’s fees, but the court retains discretion to determine that a fee award (or a particular amount) is inappropriate.
- Statutory language permitting fees “based on actual time expended” authorizes a time-based calculation but does not require the court to award the full amount of time claimed.
- The statutory use of “shall” obligates the court to decide the fee question; it does not remove the court’s discretion over amount.
- Fee awards are reviewed on appeal for clear abuse of discretion; appellate courts generally do not substitute their judgment for the trial court’s assessment of a reasonable fee.

## Conclusion

The appellate court upheld a reduced attorney’s fee award under Magnuson–Moss, concluding that the statute does not mandate a full time-based fee and that the trial court acted within its discretion when it awarded $450 in fees in a modest warranty dispute.


Hanks v. Pandolfo, 450 A.2d 1167 (Conn. Super. Ct. App. Sess. 1982)