Harris v Goddard [1983] 3 All ER 242

Facts

• Mr. and Mrs. Harris owned their matrimonial home as joint tenants.
• After their relationship broke down, Mrs. Harris initiated divorce proceedings.
• In her divorce petition, Mrs. Harris sought the court’s consideration of a property transfer and/or settlement under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 regarding the marital home.
• The petition did not expressly state an intention to sever the joint tenancy; instead, it requested the court to consider severance as part of the divorce outcome.
• Before any determination was made by the court, Mr. Harris died in an accident.
• The key question arose whether Mrs. Harris’s divorce petition constituted effective written notice to sever the joint tenancy under section 36(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925, affecting her rights in the property after Mr. Harris's death.

Issues

1. Does a divorce petition seeking the court’s future consideration of property division constitute an effective notice to sever a joint tenancy under s36(2) LPA 1925?
2. Must a notice to sever show a clear and immediate intention, or can it be contingent on a future court order?
3. How does the ruling in Harris v Goddard differ from the precedent set in Re Draper’s Conveyance?

Decision

• The Court of Appeal held that Mrs. Harris’s divorce petition did not sever the joint tenancy.
• A notice under s36(2) LPA 1925 must evidence a clear and immediate intention to sever the joint tenancy.
• The petition merely requested that the court consider severance as a remedy, making it a future or contingent request, rather than an immediate declaration.
• As a result, the right of survivorship was not displaced, and Mrs. Harris acquired the full property interest following Mr. Harris’s death.
• The court distinguished this case from Re Draper’s Conveyance because, in that case, the notice clearly expressed an immediate intent to sever.

Legal Principles

• Severance of a joint tenancy under s36(2) LPA 1925 requires notice in writing demonstrating a present, unambiguous intent to sever.
• A conditional or future-oriented request—such as asking a court to consider severance—is insufficient; severance must not depend on further events or decisions.
• The wording of notices or petitions is critical: only clear, unequivocal expression of immediate desire to sever is legally effective.
• The case contrasts with Re Draper’s Conveyance, where an explicit request for sale and division was held to be sufficient for severance.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeal in Harris v Goddard clarified that only a clear and immediate intention to sever a joint tenancy, expressed in writing, will suffice under s36(2) LPA 1925; a contingent or future-looking request is inadequate, and thus Mrs. Harris's divorce petition did not effect severance.