## Facts

- In 1862, during the Civil War, Clarksville residents anticipated Union troops entering the city.
- Local merchants held large quantities of whiskey and other spirits, believed likely to endanger lives and property if seized by arriving soldiers.
- At a public meeting, citizens resolved to destroy the liquor as a safety measure and to recommend raising funds via a special tax to reimburse owners.
- Agents were appointed to seize and destroy liquor; Harrison’s liquor was destroyed as part of the effort.
- Harrison later sued Wisdom and other participating citizens to recover the liquor’s value.
- At trial, it emerged the presiding judge had been present at the 1862 meeting; Harrison moved for the judge’s recusal, which was denied.
- A jury returned a verdict for defendants based on public necessity; Harrison appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial judge was constitutionally disqualified to preside because he attended the earlier public meeting that discussed destroying the liquor.
2. Whether citizens who destroyed private liquor as a wartime safety measure were civilly liable to the owner, particularly where the owner participated or consented.

## Decision

- The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the recusal motion.
- The court held the judge’s attendance at the public meeting did not constitute an “interest” in the case’s outcome that required disqualification.
- The court affirmed the judgment for defendants on the merits.
- The court accepted public necessity as a justification for the coordinated destruction of liquor under the wartime emergency, especially given Harrison’s acquiescence/participation.

## Legal Principles

- A judge is disqualified when the judge has a legally cognizable interest in the case’s outcome; mere prior attendance at a public meeting related to the underlying events, without a direct interest, is insufficient.
- Judicial impartiality must be protected to avoid reasonable suspicion, but disqualification requires more than generalized prior involvement in community discussion.
- Under pressing public necessity (including wartime emergencies), intentional destruction of private property to avert imminent danger may be privileged and not actionable in damages when done in good faith as a community safety measure.
- An owner’s consent, participation, or acquiescence in the destruction of the owner’s property may bar or materially weaken a later claim for conversion or trespass damages.

## Conclusion

The court upheld both the trial judge’s participation and the defense verdict, ruling that mere attendance at a prior public meeting did not mandate recusal and that the wartime destruction of liquor to prevent imminent public harm was justified by public necessity, particularly where the owner acquiesced in the plan.


Harrison v. Wisdom, 54 Tenn. 99 (Tenn. 1872)