## Facts

- Harry Stoller and Company, Inc. owned multiple commercial brick buildings in Lowell, Massachusetts.
- A fire on April 23, 1978 started on the sixth floor of one building and destroyed five buildings and their contents.
- Three buildings, including the building where the fire began, had sprinkler systems.
- The sprinkler systems had been tested two days before the fire and worked satisfactorily.
- Water initially discharged from the sixth-floor sprinkler system during the early stages of the fire.
- A pumper truck that was initially attached to the sprinkler system was disconnected shortly thereafter.
- Adequate water pressure to allow the sprinkler system to operate properly on the sixth floor was not maintained.
- The owner alleged the city’s firefighters negligently failed to use the sprinkler systems and negligently failed to maintain adequate water pressure, contrary to generally accepted firefighting practice.
- The city did not dispute (for purposes of the appeal) that the evidence permitted findings of duty and negligence; the dispute centered on statutory immunity.

## Issues

1. Whether the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act’s discretionary function exception, G.L. c. 258, § 10(b), immunized the city from liability for firefighters’ on-scene decisions and omissions regarding use and support of existing sprinkler systems.

## Decision

- The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment notwithstanding the verdict entered for the city.
- The court held the § 10(b) discretionary function exception did not apply because the challenged conduct was operational implementation, not policy or planning.
- The jury’s plaintiff’s verdict was reinstated, subject to the statutory damages cap (resulting judgment limited to $100,000).

## Legal Principles

- Under G.L. c. 258, § 10(b), a public employer is immune only for conduct that constitutes a discretionary function in the statutory sense—actions grounded in governmental planning or policy considerations.
- The fact that public employees exercise judgment in the field does not, by itself, trigger § 10(b); ordinary professional judgment in carrying out established practices is typically operational.
- When a statute, regulation, or established agency practice prescribes a course of action, § 10(b) does not shield departures from that prescribed course.
- Courts evaluate immunity by focusing on the specific injury-producing conduct and asking whether it is policy/planning (immune) or operational execution (not immune).

## Conclusion

The court held that firefighters’ alleged failure to use and properly supply a functioning sprinkler system involved operational conduct rather than policy-based decisionmaking, so the city was not immune under the MTCA’s discretionary function exception and remained liable under the capped judgment.


Harry Stoller & Co. v. City of Lowell, 412 Mass. 139 (1992)