## Facts

- Neighboring owners in Evansville, Indiana disputed use of a shared driveway located partly on each parcel; most of the driveway lay on Timothy W. Hartig’s property.
- John Connell owned Hartig’s parcel (2210 E. Walnut St.) and, on May 31, 1994, conveyed it to Sean Holmes.
- The same day, Connell executed a written driveway-easement agreement with Melvin and Louise Stratman (owners of 2208 E. Walnut St.), granting each parcel a perpetual easement over the portion of the driveway on the other parcel.
- The Connell-to-Holmes deed was recorded June 8, 1994 at 2:24 p.m.; the driveway-easement agreement was recorded one minute later at 2:25 p.m.
- Holmes conveyed 2210 to Hartig on September 28, 1995; Holmes did not inform Hartig of the driveway-easement agreement.
- In February 1998, the Stratmans alleged Hartig blocked the driveway and refused to allow their use.
- The Stratmans first sued asserting easement-based rights; the trial court dismissed that complaint under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6).
- The Stratmans then filed an amended complaint sounding in trespass; Hartig moved for summary judgment asserting (a) election of remedies based on the earlier dismissal and (b) the easement was outside his chain of title and thus not binding.

## Issues

1. Whether the Rule 12(B)(6) dismissal of the Stratmans’ initial complaint barred their amended trespass claim under election of remedies or similar preclusion principles.
2. Whether the recorded driveway-easement agreement, recorded one minute after the deed transferring 2210 to Holmes, was within Hartig’s chain of title so as to give constructive notice and bind him.
3. Whether Hartig’s summary-judgment motion disposed of all claims, or whether a trespass claim regarding the Stratmans’ own property necessarily remained for further proceedings.

## Decision

- The court affirmed the denial of summary judgment insofar as Hartig argued the amended trespass claim was barred by election of remedies or a merits adjudication based on the prior Rule 12(B)(6) dismissal.
- The court reversed in part and ordered partial summary judgment for Hartig on the claim that the driveway-easement agreement was enforceable against him, holding the easement was recorded outside his chain of title and did not give him constructive notice.
- The court remanded because the easement ruling did not resolve all issues; a trespass claim related to Hartig’s conduct on or affecting the Stratmans’ own property could remain for adjudication.

## Legal Principles

- A Rule 12(B)(6) dismissal that does not constitute a final merits adjudication does not, by itself, bar an amended complaint asserting a different theory arising from the same dispute.
- A purchaser is charged with constructive notice only of instruments properly recorded within the purchaser’s chain of title; an instrument recorded outside the chain of title does not bind a subsequent purchaser who lacks actual notice.
- Partial summary judgment may be proper on discrete legal theories (e.g., enforceability of a recorded easement), while fact-dependent claims (e.g., trespass on another’s land) may remain for trial.

## Conclusion

The court held that the Stratmans could pursue an amended trespass claim despite the earlier Rule 12(B)(6) dismissal, but that the driveway-easement agreement—recorded after the deed out of the grantor—was outside Hartig’s chain of title and therefore not enforceable against him absent actual notice; remaining trespass issues were remanded.


Hartig v. Stratman, 729 N.E.2d 237 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)