## Facts

- The parents divorced in 1953; the divorce decree required the father to pay child support until the parties’ son reached age 21 (then the age of majority).
- The son had a long-term autism-related condition (Asperger’s syndrome) and began treatment in childhood.
- After the son turned 21, the father stopped paying support.
- The mother supported the son for many years but later became unable to continue doing so.

## Issues

1. Whether Florida law recognizes a common-law right of support for an adult child whose mental or physical incapacity began before the child reached majority.
2. Whether Fla. Stat. § 743.07(2) preserves that right and permits a court to order post-majority support in an independent action.
3. Whether a support action brought decades after the child reached adulthood is time-barred or otherwise “too late” when the dependency began before majority and continues.

## Decision

- The appellate court reversed the final summary judgment entered for the father.
- The court held the adult child had a preserved common-law right to parental support because the incapacity began before majority.
- The court rejected the argument that the claim was barred solely due to the passage of time, concluding the action could be brought after the child reached adulthood.
- The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court’s interpretation of § 743.07(2) and the continuing parental duty.
- The court limited its decision to situations where incapacity began prior to reaching majority.

## Legal Principles

- Under Florida common law, a parent’s support obligation generally ends at majority, but continues when a child is unable to support himself or herself due to mental or physical incapacity.
- Fla. Stat. § 743.07(2) functions as a savings provision preserving the preexisting common-law right to support for a dependent person whose incapacity began before majority, notwithstanding statutory changes to the age of majority.
- The right to seek support belongs to the disabled adult child, and both parents may have a continuing duty of support that is not necessarily resolved by a divorce judgment addressing ordinary child support.
- Authorities construing § 743.07(1) regarding the removal of nonage disability do not extinguish an independent support claim preserved by § 743.07(2) for a dependent adult whose incapacity began before majority.

## Conclusion

The court held that an adult disabled child whose incapacity began before majority retains a common-law right to parental support preserved by § 743.07(2), and that such a claim is not defeated merely because it is brought long after the child reaches adulthood; the summary judgment for the father was reversed and the case remanded.


Hastings v. Hastings, 841 So. 2d 484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)