## Facts

- After the 2001 anthrax letter attacks, a federal investigation sought the perpetrator(s) of the mailings that killed at least five people.
- In 2002, a New York Times columnist published several columns criticizing the FBI’s handling of the investigation and discussing a suspect initially labeled “Mr. Z.”
- The columns attributed to “Mr. Z” bioterrorism expertise, access to Fort Detrick laboratories, current anthrax vaccinations, anger toward the government, and other purportedly suspicious indicators (including alleged polygraph failures and other investigative leads).
- An August 2002 column identified “Mr. Z” as Dr. Steven J. Hatfill and urged the FBI either to publicly exonerate him or to take decisive investigative action.
- Hatfill alleged the columns, read together, conveyed that he committed the anthrax mailings and related murders, harming his reputation and causing severe emotional distress.
- Hatfill sued under Virginia law for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).
- The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), concluding the columns were not reasonably capable of defamatory meaning and that IIED was insufficiently pleaded.

## Issues

1. Whether, at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage and viewing the columns as a whole, the complaint plausibly alleged that a reasonable reader could understand the columns as stating or implying Hatfill’s responsibility for the anthrax mailings and murders under Virginia defamation law.
2. Whether the complaint sufficiently alleged the statements were “of and concerning” Hatfill and carried a defamatory meaning.
3. Whether the complaint plausibly alleged IIED under Virginia law, including outrageous and intolerable conduct and severe emotional distress.

## Decision

- The Fourth Circuit reversed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.
- Accepting the complaint’s allegations as true and drawing reasonable inferences for Hatfill, the court held the columns could be found capable of defamatory meaning because they could reasonably be read as accusing or strongly implying Hatfill committed the anthrax crimes.
- The court held the “of and concerning” element was adequately pleaded, particularly once the columns identified Hatfill by name and the complaint alleged readers understood the earlier “Mr. Z” references to be him.
- The court held Hatfill sufficiently pleaded IIED because a jury could find it outrageous to publicly single out a private individual as responsible for notorious murders during a period of national fear, and the complaint alleged severe distress and related harms.
- A dissent would have treated the columns as protected commentary urging investigative action rather than assertions of Hatfill’s guilt, emphasizing First Amendment concerns.

## Legal Principles

- On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts accept well-pleaded facts as true and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor; the question is plausibility of a legally cognizable claim, not ultimate proof.
- Under Virginia defamation law, allegedly defamatory statements must be evaluated in the context of the entire publication; whether words are capable of a defamatory meaning can be for the factfinder when reasonable readers could interpret them as charging criminal conduct.
- A defamation plaintiff must plausibly allege the publication was “of and concerning” the plaintiff; identifying the plaintiff by name and plausibly linking earlier references can satisfy the pleading requirement.
- Virginia IIED requires allegations of (1) intentional or reckless conduct, (2) outrageous and intolerable conduct, (3) causation, and (4) severe emotional distress; at the pleading stage, allegations that publicly blame a person for notorious murders and cause severe distress may be sufficient.

## Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit held that, taking the complaint’s allegations as true, the columns could reasonably be understood as implying Hatfill committed the anthrax crimes and that Hatfill adequately pleaded both defamation and IIED under Virginia law; the dismissal was reversed and the case remanded.


Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co., 416 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2005)