## Facts

- Promoters sought to secure an American Football League franchise for Washington, D.C., which required access to a suitable stadium for home games.
- A public instrumentality leased RFK Stadium to the Washington Redskins’ corporate operator under a long-term agreement.
- The lease contained an exclusivity clause barring rental of the stadium to any other professional football team during the lease term.
- The promoters alleged RFK Stadium was the only suitable facility in the Washington area for professional football.
- The promoters claimed the exclusivity clause prevented them from obtaining stadium access, which in turn prevented submission of an acceptable franchise application and entry into the local professional football market.
- The complaint alleged unreasonable restraint of trade under Sherman Act §§ 1 and 3 and monopolization under Sherman Act § 2.
- After a jury trial, judgment was entered for defendants.

## Issues

1. Whether the promoters alleged injury to “business or property” and a sufficient causal link between the exclusivity clause and their inability to enter the market for purposes of private antitrust recovery.
2. Whether the jury was properly instructed on the relevant geographic market for professional football competition affecting Washington, D.C.
3. Whether the jury was properly instructed on monopolization, including the role of intent, market power, and exclusionary conduct under Sherman Act § 2.
4. Whether the jury should have been instructed on an essential facility theory where the stadium was alleged to be the only feasible venue.
5. Whether the jury instructions adequately stated the rule-of-reason standard for evaluating the lease restraint under Sherman Act §§ 1 and 3.
6. Whether exclusion of certain documentary and testimonial evidence was erroneous and prejudicial.

## Decision

- The court of appeals reversed the judgment for defendants and remanded for a new trial.
- The court held that the jury instructions contained substantial error on market definition, causation/standing concepts, and monopolization analysis.
- The court held that failure to instruct on an essential facility theory was error given the theory and evidence presented.
- The court held that multiple evidentiary exclusions were prejudicial, including materials bearing on the feasibility of leasing the stadium to a competing team and evidence supporting the promoters’ business venture.

## Legal Principles

- Private antitrust plaintiffs may satisfy the “business or property” requirement even if the venture is formative, so long as the claimed injury is commercial in nature and not merely personal or speculative.
- Antitrust causation does not require proof with certainty that the plaintiff would have obtained the opportunity absent the restraint; the question is whether the challenged conduct materially contributed to the competitive harm alleged.
- Relevant geographic market generally turns on the area where competition actually occurs; in professional sports, this may be a local market for live exhibition rather than a nationwide market.
- Monopolization focuses on monopoly power in the relevant market plus willful maintenance or acquisition through exclusionary conduct, not on treating market dominance as lawful unless the plaintiff disproves “natural monopoly” conditions.
- Where a facility is alleged to be essential and not practically duplicable, denial of access through exclusive control may require jury consideration under an essential facility/refusal-to-deal theory.
- Rule-of-reason review requires assessing a restraint’s competitive effects in the relevant market rather than presuming validity based on asserted contractual convenience or business rationales.

## Conclusion

The court ordered a new trial because the case was tried under incorrect market, causation, and monopolization frameworks and without an essential-facility instruction, and because key evidentiary exclusions impaired the jury’s ability to evaluate whether the stadium exclusivity clause unlawfully foreclosed competition in the local professional football market.


Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977)