## Facts

- Jenna R. Helf worked at Chevron’s Salt Lake City oil refinery.
- Chevron neutralized “spent caustic” in an open-air pit by adding chemicals including sulfuric acid.
- Earlier the same day as Helf’s injury, a prior addition of sulfuric acid to the pit allegedly produced a large visible gas cloud, triggered chemical alarms, and caused multiple workers to become ill.
- Later that day, Helf’s supervisor instructed her to add sulfuric acid to the same pit.
- A new reaction occurred, generating poisonous gas that exposed Helf and caused serious injuries, including an alleged permanent seizure disorder.
- Helf received workers’ compensation benefits and then sued Chevron in tort under the Workers’ Compensation Act’s intentional-injury exception, alleging Chevron personnel knew injury was substantially certain to result from repeating the process.

## Issues

1. Whether the summary-judgment record created a genuine dispute that at least one Chevron manager knew, with substantial certainty, that Helf would be injured by being directed to repeat the chemical process.
2. Whether Helf’s receipt of workers’ compensation benefits barred her intentional-tort claim under the election-of-remedies doctrine.

## Decision

- The Utah Supreme Court reversed summary judgment for Chevron and remanded.
- The court held the evidence permitted a reasonable inference that at least one Chevron manager knew the earlier incident occurred and that repeating the process posed a substantially certain risk of injury to the worker performing it.
- The court held the election-of-remedies doctrine did not bar Helf’s intentional-tort claim merely because she received workers’ compensation benefits.
- A dissent would have affirmed summary judgment, viewing the evidence as insufficient to show the required substantial certainty.

## Legal Principles

- Workers’ compensation is generally the exclusive remedy for workplace injuries, but an intentional-injury exception allows a tort action when the employer intended injury or knew injury was substantially certain to occur.
- For employer liability under the intentional-injury exception, evidence must support that management-level personnel possessed the requisite intent or substantial-certainty knowledge.
- On summary judgment, courts must draw reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party; circumstantial evidence (including a closely similar prior incident with alarms and worker illness) can create a triable issue of managerial knowledge.
- Acceptance of workers’ compensation benefits does not, by itself, preclude a separate intentional-tort action when the intentional-injury exception is properly alleged and supported.

## Conclusion

The Utah Supreme Court held that evidence surrounding a similar toxic release earlier the same day could allow a jury to find that Chevron management knew Helf’s injury was substantially certain, making summary judgment improper, and it further held that receiving workers’ compensation benefits did not bar Helf’s intentional-tort claim.


Helf v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 361 P.3d 63 (Utah 2015)