## Facts

- Two defendants picked up an intoxicated man, robbed him, and left him at night on an unlighted rural road with limited visibility due to blowing snow.
- Approximately 20–30 minutes later, the victim, seated in the roadway and unable to protect himself, was struck and killed by a speeding truck.
- The prosecution charged second-degree murder under a state statute requiring reckless conduct showing depraved indifference that creates a grave risk of death and “thereby causes” the victim’s death.
- At trial, causation was a central disputed issue, including whether the truck driver’s conduct was an intervening cause.
- Neither party requested a jury instruction specifically explaining the statutory causation phrase “thereby causes,” and the trial court did not provide one.
- The trial court read the statute and an indictment tracking its language, instructed that all elements must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and defined “recklessly” as conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur.
- The jury convicted the defendant of grand larceny, robbery, and second-degree murder.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court’s failure to give a specific instruction explaining the statutory causation element (“thereby causes”) amounted to a federal constitutional error warranting federal habeas corpus relief.
2. Whether, in context, the omission created an impermissible risk that the jury failed to find an element beyond a reasonable doubt as required by due process.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the federal court of appeals and denied habeas relief.
- The Court held that the omission of a more detailed causation instruction did not rise to a due process violation in the circumstances.
- The Court reasoned that the jury was informed causation was an element requiring decision because the statute and indictment were read, the jury was told every element had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and the parties’ arguments focused heavily on causation.
- The Court emphasized that on collateral review, the petitioner bears a heavy burden to show the omission made the trial fundamentally unfair, and that omissions are generally less prejudicial than affirmative misstatements of law.
- The Court evaluated the claimed defect in light of the entire charge and trial record, not in isolation.

## Legal Principles

- On federal habeas review, an instructional error supports relief only if it so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.
- The burden to show prejudice from a state-court instructional error is higher on collateral attack than on direct review.
- An omission or incomplete instruction is less likely to be constitutionally prejudicial than an instruction that affirmatively misstates the law.
- A challenged instruction (or omission) must be assessed in the context of the overall charge and the full trial record.
- Due process is not violated merely because the court did not provide an additional clarifying instruction on an element when the jury was otherwise told to find all elements beyond a reasonable doubt and the element was placed before the jury through the charge and the parties’ presentation.

## Conclusion

The Supreme Court held that the absence of a specific causation instruction did not deny due process on federal habeas review because the overall jury charge and trial presentation sufficiently placed causation before the jury and required proof of every element beyond a reasonable doubt.


Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145 (1977)