## Facts

- Federal prosecutors charged Thomas J. Henderson, Scott O. Thornton, and Ruth Freedman with offenses related to controlled substances in the District of Nevada.
- The Speedy Trial Act’s 70-day period began running on September 3, 1980.
- Trial began on November 1, 1982, after delays that included:
  - A defense motion to suppress evidence, a hearing on that motion, and post-hearing submissions.
  - A defense motion for reconsideration of the suppression ruling.
  - A defense motion to dismiss the indictment for an asserted Speedy Trial Act violation.
- The district court denied dismissal, treated substantial motion-related time as excludable under the Act, and the defendants were convicted.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the argument that only “reasonably necessary” delays are excludable under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F).

## Issues

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F) excludes all time between the filing of a pretrial motion and the conclusion of the hearing on that motion, or only time that is “reasonably necessary.”
2. Whether § 3161(h)(1)(F) excludes time after a motion hearing while the district court awaits additional filings needed to decide the motion.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.
- The Court held that § 3161(h)(1)(F) automatically excludes all time from the filing of a pretrial motion through the conclusion of the hearing, without a “reasonably necessary” limitation.
- The Court held that § 3161(h)(1)(F) also excludes post-hearing time when the district court is awaiting additional submissions needed for proper disposition of the motion.
- The Court left the convictions intact because the challenged period was properly excluded from the Speedy Trial Act calculation.

## Legal Principles

- Under § 3161(h)(1)(F), the period from filing a pretrial motion through completion of the hearing on that motion is excluded from the Speedy Trial Act’s 70-day trial clock, regardless of whether the hearing was prompt.
- The phrase “or other prompt disposition” addresses motions decided without a hearing; it does not impose a general reasonableness limit on delay in holding a hearing.
- Post-hearing time is excludable under § 3161(h)(1)(F) when the court is awaiting necessary filings requested or required to resolve the motion.
- When Congress intended a “reasonable period of delay” limitation, it said so expressly elsewhere in § 3161(h); the absence of that language in subsection (F) indicates an automatic exclusion.
- In joint trials, Speedy Trial Act computations generally track the latest codefendant, and exclusions applicable to one codefendant may affect all joined defendants.

## Conclusion

The Court interpreted the Speedy Trial Act’s motion-related exclusion to toll the 70-day clock automatically from the filing of a pretrial motion through the hearing (and through necessary post-hearing submissions required for decision), rejecting any implied “reasonably necessary” constraint in § 3161(h)(1)(F).


Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321 (1986)