## Facts

- Lloyd Henderson, a merchant mariner, was injured on August 27, 1991, while working aboard a vessel owned and operated by the United States.
- After completing administrative steps, Henderson filed a personal injury action against the United States on April 8, 1993, under the Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA), within the SAA’s two-year limitations period.
- Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3, the action was commenced by filing the complaint within the limitations period.
- Henderson served the Attorney General 47 days after filing and served the United States Attorney 148 days after filing, after obtaining an extension under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4’s service timetable.
- The United States did not claim lack of notice within the limitations period or prejudice from the timing of service.
- The government sought dismissal on the ground that SAA § 2 required the plaintiff to serve process “forthwith,” and the lower courts treated that requirement as jurisdictional.

## Issues

1. Whether SAA § 2’s “forthwith” service requirement is a jurisdictional condition on the United States’ waiver of sovereign immunity.
2. Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, through the Rules Enabling Act, supersedes SAA § 2’s “forthwith” service instruction in SAA actions timely commenced under the statute of limitations.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and remanded.
- The Court held that SAA § 2’s “forthwith” instruction for service of process is superseded by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.
- Failure to serve “forthwith” under SAA § 2 is not a defect depriving the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction when the action is timely filed and service complies with Rule 4 (including authorized extensions).

## Legal Principles

- Under the Rules Enabling Act, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern matters of practice and procedure, and conflicting statutory provisions have no further force or effect.
- In federal actions timely commenced under the applicable statute of limitations, the manner and timing of service of process are generally nonjurisdictional procedural matters governed by the Federal Rules.
- A statutory waiver of sovereign immunity is not rendered wholly “jurisdictional” merely because it appears in a waiver statute; procedural directions about case processing (including service) do not define the scope of the waiver.
- Rule 4’s service framework irreconcilably conflicts with a statutory command to serve “forthwith,” and Rule 4 controls.

## Conclusion

Because Henderson timely commenced his SAA action and effected service within the period permitted by Rule 4 (as extended by the district court), the suit could not be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on SAA § 2’s “forthwith” service language, which is displaced by the Federal Rules.


Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654 (1996)