## Facts

- Marjorie Gayle Hendrix entered an intersection on a green light and was struck by a Jeep driven by Charles Robert Burns, who ran a red light during a high-speed pursuit of another vehicle.
- Hendrix’s vehicle was severely damaged; she was extracted with rescue equipment and feared she might die.
- Hendrix suffered physical injuries and later reported emotional trauma, including depression.
- After the crash, Hendrix learned Burns had consumed alcohol, had engaged in “road rage,” attempted to leave the scene, and had a history of driving violations and DUI convictions.
- Hendrix sued Charles Burns for negligence and battery and sued Candice Marie Burns (vehicle owner) for negligent entrustment.
- Before trial, the circuit court: (a) granted summary judgment to Charles Burns on battery; (b) the Burns defendants admitted liability on negligence and negligent entrustment, leaving damages as the only trial issue; (c) excluded evidence of Burns’s intoxication, pursuit, attempted flight, and prior record; and (d) struck Hendrix’s proposed amended pleading against Candice Burns.
- A jury awarded Hendrix $85,000 in compensatory damages; Hendrix appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether summary judgment was improper because Burns’s driving conduct supported the intent element required for civil battery.
2. Whether the trial court erred or abused its discretion by excluding evidence of Burns’s intoxication, “road rage,” attempted flight, and prior record in a damages-only trial, including to support emotional distress after Hendrix learned those facts.
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by striking Hendrix’s late amendment to her negligent-entrustment allegations.

## Decision

- The appellate court affirmed the judgment.
- Summary judgment on battery was proper because the record did not support an inference that Burns intended the harmful contact or acted with substantial certainty that contact with Hendrix would occur.
- The evidentiary exclusions were upheld because the proffered post-accident information was not relevant to legally compensable emotional-distress damages in this context and, alternatively, posed a substantial risk of unfair prejudice outweighing any probative value.
- Striking the late amendment was within the trial court’s discretion given timing and the limited scope of the remaining issue (damages) after liability was admitted.

## Legal Principles

- Civil battery requires intentional harmful or offensive contact; reckless, grossly negligent, or dangerous driving does not become battery without proof of intent (or substantial certainty) to cause the contact.
- In automobile “impact” cases, compensable emotional distress generally includes (a) fright experienced during the collision and (b) distress proximately resulting from physical injury; distress based solely on facts learned later about the defendant’s conduct or background is not compensable on that theory.
- In a damages-only trial after liability is admitted, evidence primarily inviting a punitive reaction (e.g., intoxication, flight, prior convictions) may be excluded as irrelevant to compensatory damages and as unfairly prejudicial under evidentiary balancing.
- Decisions on motions in limine and on whether to allow late amendments to pleadings are reviewed for abuse of discretion; courts may deny amendments that risk delay, confusion, or unfairness, especially where they do not materially affect the issues remaining for trial.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed a damages-only verdict, holding that extreme reckless driving without proof of intent cannot support civil battery, that post-accident discoveries about a defendant’s misconduct and record were properly excluded from a compensatory-damages trial, and that the trial court acted within its discretion in striking a late negligent-entrustment amendment.


Hendrix v. Burns, 205 Md. App. 1, 43 A.3d 415 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012)