## Facts

- Barbara Mitten Hennagir worked as a physician’s assistant for the Utah Department of Corrections (DOC) at a correctional facility from 1997 to 2005.
- After she was hired, DOC adopted a policy requiring Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) certification for medical and clinical positions involving inmate contact.
- POST certification included physically demanding training and testing for strength, flexibility, endurance, and physical safety skills.
- DOC linked the POST requirement to prison safety concerns and risk-management recommendations following an inmate attack on medical staff.
- Hennagir had physical impairments affecting her shoulders, knees, and back and could not complete the POST physical component.
- She requested to remain in her physician’s assistant position without POST certification (or to be excused from the physical portion).
- DOC refused to waive POST for her position but offered alternative positions that did not require POST; Hennagir declined them due to factors such as pay, schedule, and location.
- After extended leave and failure to return to a POST-certified position or accept alternatives, DOC terminated her employment in 2005.
- Hennagir sued under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act for disability discrimination and failure to accommodate, and also alleged retaliation based on internal complaints and EEOC activity.
- The district court granted summary judgment to DOC on all claims.

## Issues

1. Whether a job requirement that is infrequently used in daily work can still be an “essential function” under the ADA due to the severity of consequences if the function cannot be performed when needed.
2. Whether it is a reasonable accommodation to exempt an employee from an essential POST physical-training requirement or to keep the employee in the same job with that requirement removed.
3. Whether the evidence supported a retaliation claim based on adverse action allegedly taken because of protected activity.

## Decision

- The Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for DOC.
- The court held that POST physical safety training was an essential function of Hennagir’s inmate-contact physician’s assistant position.
- The court held Hennagir’s requested accommodation was unreasonable because it would remove an essential job requirement.
- The court held DOC’s offers of alternative non-POST positions could satisfy the duty to accommodate as a matter of law.
- The court held Hennagir failed to show a genuine fact dispute that DOC acted with retaliatory motive rather than enforcing a safety-based job standard and responding to her refusal to accept alternatives.

## Legal Principles

- An ADA “essential function” may include duties or capabilities that are rarely used in ordinary routines when the consequences of inability to perform them are severe, particularly in safety- and security-sensitive settings.
- Substantial weight is given to the employer’s judgment, written descriptions and policies, and the consequences of excusing performance when determining essential functions.
- A proposed accommodation is not reasonable if it eliminates an essential function; an employee is not entitled to the same job with the essential requirement removed.
- Reasonable accommodation may be provided through reassignment to available positions within the employee’s limitations, even if the reassigned job differs in location, schedule, or other conditions.
- Retaliation requires evidence that materially adverse action was taken because of protected activity; enforcement of a preexisting, legitimate job requirement and termination after refusal to comply or accept reassignment does not, without more, establish causation.

## Conclusion

The court upheld DOC’s POST requirement for inmate-contact medical staff as an essential job function despite infrequent physical intervention, ruled that waiving the requirement was not a reasonable accommodation, and found no triable retaliation claim where the record reflected enforcement of a safety-based policy and rejected reassignment options.


Hennagir v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 587 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2009)