## Facts

- Fred J. Hermes, proceeding pro se, applied for Social Security retirement insurance benefits on November 30, 1987.
- Eligibility turned on whether Hermes had reached age 62 when he applied.
- Hermes claimed he was born May 21, 1925, which would have made him age-eligible.
- The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied the claim initially and on reconsideration, concluding Hermes was born November 21, 1928 and therefore was not yet 62.
- Hermes sought a de novo hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ).
- At the hearing, Hermes acknowledged that he had used different birth years over time (ranging from 1925 to 1930) on various records; he stated he did so to appear younger and not to commit fraud.
- To support a 1925 birth date, Hermes submitted a religious birth record from Iraq listing that date.
- The religious record was not recorded until 1981, decades after the claimed birth, and SSA guidelines cautioned that Iraqi religious birth records were often unreliable because records might not exist and could be prepared upon request.
- The ALJ declined to credit the late-recorded Iraqi religious record.
- Instead, the ALJ relied on the oldest record in the file that listed a birth date and was corroborated by other materials: Hermes’s college record recorded in 1954, which listed his birth date as November 21, 1928.
- The ALJ noted that the 1928 date was also supported by Hermes’s marriage certificate, a later SSA record, and his certificate of naturalization.
- The ALJ found Hermes’s date of birth was November 21, 1928 and denied benefits because Hermes had not reached age 62 when he applied.
- The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
- Hermes sought judicial review in federal district court; the district court granted summary judgment for the Secretary.
- Hermes appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing only that the ALJ incorrectly found his birth date.

## Issues

1. Whether substantial evidence supported the Secretary’s final decision that Hermes was born on November 21, 1928 (and not in 1925), making him ineligible for retirement benefits when he applied.
2. Whether the reviewing court could set aside the ALJ’s resolution of conflicting birth-date evidence, including the ALJ’s decision to discount a late-recorded Iraqi religious birth record.

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for the Secretary.
- The court held that the Secretary’s decision could be disturbed only if it lacked substantial evidence or rested on legal error.
- The court concluded substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that Hermes’s birth date was November 21, 1928, based on the 1954 college record and corroborating official documents.
- The court held it could not reweigh the evidence or replace the ALJ’s choice among competing proofs where the record as a whole could support either outcome.

## Legal Principles

- The grant of summary judgment by a district court is reviewed de novo, applying the same standard used by the district court.
- In Social Security cases, the Secretary’s final decision is affirmed unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence or based on legal error.
- When the administrative record can reasonably support more than one result, a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for the ALJ’s resolution of evidentiary conflicts.
- An ALJ may reasonably give less weight to late-created or late-recorded documentation of questionable reliability and give more weight to earlier records that were created independently of the benefits claim and are corroborated by other official documents.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of Hermes’s Social Security retirement benefits because the ALJ’s finding that Hermes was born on November 21, 1928 was supported by substantial evidence, and the court would not overturn the ALJ’s resolution of conflicting documents or reweigh the proof under the deferential standard of review.


Hermes v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 926 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1991)