## Facts

- Laura Luis Hernandez, a Mexican national without lawful status, married a lawful permanent resident in 1990.
- During the marriage, she suffered severe domestic violence and fled from Mexico to the United States, briefly returned after her husband persuaded her to do so, and later left again.
- In removal proceedings, she sought (1) suspension of deportation under the VAWA battered-spouse provision requiring that she “has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty in the United States,” and (2) adjustment of status based on a family-based visa petition filed by her husband.
- The Immigration Judge denied relief, finding her not credible, concluding she failed to prove qualifying abuse for VAWA suspension, and denying adjustment as a matter of discretion.
- The BIA rejected the adverse credibility finding but still denied VAWA suspension on the ground that she had not been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty “in the United States.”
- The BIA also affirmed denial of adjustment, stating she had not adequately shown an approved visa petition and visa availability and approving discretionary denial because the marriage was no longer in existence.
- Hernandez petitioned for review.

## Issues

1. Whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review the agency’s determination that Hernandez was not “battered or subjected to extreme cruelty in the United States,” or whether that determination was insulated as discretionary.
2. How “extreme cruelty” and the “in the United States” requirement should be interpreted for VAWA-based suspension of deportation.
3. Whether the BIA legally erred in affirming denial of adjustment of status based on visa-petition/availability grounds and reliance on dissolution of the marriage as a negative discretionary factor.

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit held it had jurisdiction because the “extreme cruelty” determination involved application of a statutory eligibility standard, not an unreviewable discretionary judgment.
- The court reversed the BIA’s denial of VAWA suspension, concluding the agency applied an unduly narrow interpretation of “extreme cruelty” and the United States nexus.
- The court relied on the agency’s regulatory definition of “extreme cruelty” and Congress’s intent to evaluate domestic violence consistent with professional and clinical understandings, including patterns of coercion and control that may not produce physical injury.
- The court reversed the denial of adjustment of status, finding the BIA’s stated grounds erroneous or unsupported, including the use of the marriage’s termination as a dispositive negative factor in a domestic-violence context.
- The petition for review was granted and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court’s opinion.

## Legal Principles

- Jurisdiction-stripping provisions do not bar review of statutory eligibility determinations that turn on interpretation and application of legal standards, even when ultimate relief is discretionary.
- “Extreme cruelty” under VAWA is not limited to discrete physical assaults; it can include nonphysical abuse and coercive conduct as part of a pattern of domestic violence, consistent with the regulatory definition.
- The statutory requirement that abuse be “in the United States” must be applied to the full course of abusive conduct and its connection to the victim’s presence in the United States, not confined to the location of physical injuries alone.
- In assessing discretionary immigration relief connected to domestic violence, the agency may not treat the victim’s separation from or dissolution of the abusive marriage as an automatic adverse factor in a way that conflicts with VAWA’s purpose of allowing victims to seek status independent of abusers.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit ruled that VAWA “extreme cruelty” is a reviewable eligibility question, construed the standard to include coercive and nonphysical abuse consistent with the regulation and congressional purpose, and reversed and remanded the BIA’s denials of both VAWA-based suspension of deportation and adjustment of status.


Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824 (9th Cir. 2003)