## Facts

- A Vermont school district hired Dr. Ebaristo “Abe” Herrera as a high school principal under a two-year contract (July 1, 2000–June 30, 2002).
- The contract stated that if the school board chose not to reemploy him or if it suspended or dismissed him during the term, he could appeal under 16 V.S.A. § 243.
- Relations between Herrera and school staff deteriorated; multiple staff members complained in writing that his leadership was authoritarian, intimidating, and demeaning and created a hostile working environment.
- The superintendent investigated and recommended that the board remove Herrera from active service by placing him on paid administrative leave for the remainder of the contract.
- In April 2001, the board voted to relieve Herrera of all duties immediately, place him on paid leave through the end of the contract term, and not renew his contract, without providing pre-deprivation notice or a hearing.
- The board communicated to the community that Herrera had been relieved of his duties and referenced serious concerns about leadership, morale, and school functioning; local media reported on the controversy and the removal.
- Herrera alleged the removal and public communications harmed his reputation and future employment prospects in school administration.

## Issues

1. Whether placing a principal on paid administrative leave for the remainder of a fixed-term contract while removing all duties constitutes a “suspension” or “dismissal” triggering appeal procedures under 16 V.S.A. § 243 and the contract.
2. Whether the district deprived Herrera of a constitutionally protected property interest without due process when he received full salary and benefits through the contract term.
3. Whether the district’s actions and public statements in connection with Herrera’s removal created a triable liberty-interest (“stigma-plus”) due process claim requiring a name-clearing hearing.

## Decision

- Reversed summary judgment for defendants on Herrera’s breach-of-contract and § 243 claims because the paid leave that stripped all duties was, as a matter of law, a de facto termination triggering statutory and contractual procedures.
- Affirmed in substantial part summary judgment against Herrera’s broader property-interest due process theory, treating the property-interest claim as overlapping with the contract and § 243 procedural rights given full pay and benefits.
- Reversed summary judgment on the liberty-interest due process claim, holding the record contained sufficient evidence of possible stigmatization connected to his removal to require fact-finding.
- Remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings.

## Legal Principles

- For fixed-term public employment, removal from all duties for the balance of the contract can be functionally equivalent to termination even if pay and benefits continue.
- Statutory and contractual procedural protections for removal cannot be avoided through formal labels or by continuing compensation when the employee is deprived of the substance of the position.
- A public employee’s property-interest due process claim may be coextensive with contract- and statute-based rights when the alleged deprivation concerns continued employment and specified procedures rather than unpaid wages.
- Under the “stigma-plus” doctrine, a liberty-interest claim can arise when stigmatizing assertions are publicly disclosed in connection with an adverse change in legal status, such as termination, potentially entitling the employee to a name-clearing hearing.
- Summary judgment is improper on a liberty-interest claim when material facts remain disputed regarding the content, dissemination, and stigmatizing effect of statements tied to removal.

## Conclusion

The Vermont Supreme Court held that placing a principal on paid leave while stripping all duties for the remainder of a fixed-term contract constitutes a de facto termination that triggers contractual and statutory appeal procedures, and it required further proceedings on whether public, critical communications connected to the removal created a liberty-interest due process right to a name-clearing hearing.


Herrera v. Union No. 39 Sch. Dist., 917 A.2d 923 (Vt. 2006)