## Facts

- Gladys M. Green owned a vacant residential lot (“Lot S”) in Plymouth, Massachusetts, and advertised it for sale.
- Thomas and Mrs. Hickey orally agreed with Green to purchase Lot S for $15,000.
- The Hickeys delivered a $500 deposit check referencing the lot and stating the deposit was “subject to variance from Town of Plymouth”; the payee line was left blank for Green to complete.
- Green retained the check but did not fill in the payee, endorse it, or cash it; it was later determined no zoning variance was required.
- Green knew the Hickeys intended to sell their existing home and build on Lot S.
- Relying on the oral agreement, the Hickeys advertised their home, entered an agreement to sell it, and accepted and deposited the home buyer’s $500 deposit check within about ten days.
- Green then repudiated, stating she no longer intended to sell to the Hickeys and would sell to another buyer for $16,000; Hickey offered $16,000 but Green refused.
- The Hickeys sued for specific performance; Green asserted the Statute of Frauds as a defense.
- On stipulated facts, the trial court ordered specific performance; Green appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether an oral contract for the sale of land may be specifically enforced notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds when the buyers, with the seller’s knowledge, substantially change position in reasonable reliance on the agreement.
2. Whether the seller is equitably estopped from asserting the Statute of Frauds under these circumstances.

## Decision

- The Appeals Court held that Green was estopped from asserting the Statute of Frauds as a defense.
- The court affirmed that specific performance could be available based on the buyers’ reliance and resulting change of position.
- The case was remanded to allow the trial judge, in her discretion, to receive evidence or stipulations on any changed circumstances (including whether the Hickeys remained obligated to sell their home) and to reconsider the judgment accordingly.

## Legal Principles

- A land-transfer agreement may be specifically enforced despite noncompliance with the Statute of Frauds when the party seeking enforcement reasonably relies on the contract and the other party’s continuing assent and so changes position that injustice can be avoided only by specific enforcement.
- Equitable estoppel may bar a Statute of Frauds defense where the promisor knows of, and benefits from, the promisee’s substantial reliance and then repudiates to pursue a better deal.
- Substantial reliance can include actions that likely bind the promisee to a significant transaction (such as committing to sell an existing home) undertaken promptly after the oral agreement and known to the promisor.
- A court may consider post-judgment changes affecting the propriety or practicality of specific performance on remand.

## Conclusion

The court applied equitable estoppel to prevent a seller from using the Statute of Frauds to escape an oral land sale after knowingly inducing buyers to commit to selling their home; it affirmed the equitable basis for specific performance but remanded for consideration of any materially changed circumstances.


Hickey v. Green, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 671, 442 N.E.2d 37 (1982)