## Facts

- Stephanie Hicks worked as a Tuscaloosa Police Department officer, later serving as a narcotics task-force investigator.
- After Hicks became pregnant, her captain temporarily adjusted her duties to avoid nights and weekends; her supervising lieutenant expressed irritation about Hicks avoiding on-call obligations.
- Hicks took twelve weeks of FMLA leave; her supervisor repeatedly told her she should take only six weeks.
- Before leave, Hicks received an evaluation stating she exceeded expectations; on her first day back, she was written up and assigned additional work involving multiple confidential informants.
- Evidence showed the supervisor made hostile, profanity-laden remarks about Hicks’s pregnancy and her taking twelve weeks of leave, including statements about writing her up and getting her “out of here.”
- Eight days after returning from leave, the police chief reassigned Hicks from the narcotics unit to patrol.
- The reassignment resulted in loss of an unmarked vehicle, loss of weekends off, a pay cut, and a requirement to wear a ballistic vest all day on patrol.
- While breastfeeding, Hicks provided a physician letter stating the standard vest was too restrictive, risked breast infection, and could impede breastfeeding; the physician recommended reassignment.
- The City declined to reassign her and offered either not wearing a vest or using a specially fitted vest that left areas unprotected; Hicks viewed both options as unsafe for patrol work.
- Hicks resigned and claimed constructive discharge, alleging the City’s actions were motivated by pregnancy discrimination and retaliation for taking FMLA leave.

## Issues

1. Whether sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding of pregnancy discrimination under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, including a constructive-discharge theory.
2. Whether sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding of FMLA retaliation.
3. Whether the district court erred in denying the City’s post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law.
4. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying a new trial and whether the jury instructions misstated the law or prejudiced the City.

## Decision

- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment for Hicks.
- The court held the evidence permitted a reasonable jury to find the City liable for pregnancy discrimination and FMLA retaliation.
- The court held the evidence permitted a reasonable jury to find constructive discharge based on objectively intolerable working conditions.
- The court upheld the denial of judgment as a matter of law and a new trial and concluded the jury instructions, read as a whole, accurately stated the governing standards.

## Legal Principles

- Pregnancy Discrimination Act claims may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence; a jury may infer discriminatory motive from hostile remarks, temporal proximity, and evidence that an employer’s stated reasons are pretextual.
- FMLA retaliation requires proof of protected activity, adverse action, and causation; close timing between protected leave and adverse action, along with statements tied to the leave, can support causation and pretext findings.
- Constructive discharge exists when working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign; the assessment considers the cumulative effect of adverse changes and working conditions.
- Appellate review of a jury verdict and denial of judgment as a matter of law asks whether the record permits a reasonable jury to reach the verdict when evidence is viewed in the verdict’s favor; jury-instruction challenges require a showing of legal error and prejudice.

## Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit upheld a jury verdict that the City discriminated against a pregnant, breastfeeding police officer and retaliated for her use of FMLA leave, concluding that the rapid post-leave discipline and reassignment, loss of pay and benefits, and unresolved vest-related medical and safety concerns supported findings of pretext and constructive discharge.


Hicks v. City of Tuscaloosa, 870 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2017)