## Facts

- Nevada law authorized officers, during a stop based on reasonable suspicion, to detain a person to ascertain identity and suspicious circumstances.
- Police received a report of a man assaulting a woman near a red-and-silver GMC truck.
- An officer arrived, saw a matching truck with signs of a sudden stop, found Larry Hiibel outside the vehicle, and observed a woman inside.
- During the investigative stop, the officer repeatedly requested Hiibel’s name; Hiibel refused multiple times and challenged the officer to arrest him.
- Hiibel was arrested and charged with willfully resisting, delaying, or obstructing an officer, based on refusing to identify himself.
- Hiibel was convicted; state appellate courts affirmed against Fourth and Fifth Amendment challenges.

## Issues

1. Whether the Fourth Amendment permits a state to require a suspect to disclose his name during a valid Terry stop and to arrest for refusal.
2. Whether compelling a suspect to state his name during such a stop violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed in a 5–4 decision.
- The Court held the Fourth Amendment permits a state to require a suspect to disclose his name during a valid Terry stop.
- The Court held the Fifth Amendment was not violated on these facts because Hiibel did not show a reasonable belief that stating his name would be incriminating.
- The Court noted that a different case could arise if a suspect articulated a reasonable risk that giving a name would be incriminating.

## Legal Principles

- During a valid Terry stop supported by reasonable suspicion, a state may require a suspect to state his name without violating the Fourth Amendment.
- A stop-and-identify law is more likely consistent with the Fourth Amendment when it is narrow, applies only during lawful investigative stops, and requires only disclosure of a name rather than production of documents or unspecified “reliable” identification.
- Requests for identification are a standard part of investigative stops and may serve officer-safety and investigative interests, including confirming or dispelling suspicion.
- The Fifth Amendment privilege applies only when compelled disclosure presents a real and appreciable risk of self-incrimination; stating one’s name ordinarily does not trigger the privilege absent a specific showing of incrimination risk.

## Conclusion

A state may enforce a narrowly drawn stop-and-identify statute during a Terry stop based on reasonable suspicion by requiring a suspect to state his name, and the Fifth Amendment does not bar that requirement absent an articulated, reasonable risk that the name itself would be incriminating.


Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177 (2004)