Facts
- Nevada law authorized officers, during a stop based on reasonable suspicion, to detain a person to ascertain identity and suspicious circumstances.
- Police received a report of a man assaulting a woman near a red-and-silver GMC truck.
- An officer arrived, saw a matching truck with signs of a sudden stop, found Larry Hiibel outside the vehicle, and observed a woman inside.
- During the investigative stop, the officer repeatedly requested Hiibel’s name; Hiibel refused multiple times and challenged the officer to arrest him.
- Hiibel was arrested and charged with willfully resisting, delaying, or obstructing an officer, based on refusing to identify himself.
- Hiibel was convicted; state appellate courts affirmed against Fourth and Fifth Amendment challenges.
Issues
- Whether the Fourth Amendment permits a state to require a suspect to disclose his name during a valid Terry stop and to arrest for refusal.
- Whether compelling a suspect to state his name during such a stop violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Decision
- The Supreme Court affirmed in a 5–4 decision.
- The Court held the Fourth Amendment permits a state to require a suspect to disclose his name during a valid Terry stop.
- The Court held the Fifth Amendment was not violated on these facts because Hiibel did not show a reasonable belief that stating his name would be incriminating.
- The Court noted that a different case could arise if a suspect articulated a reasonable risk that giving a name would be incriminating.
Legal Principles
- During a valid Terry stop supported by reasonable suspicion, a state may require a suspect to state his name without violating the Fourth Amendment.
- A stop-and-identify law is more likely consistent with the Fourth Amendment when it is narrow, applies only during lawful investigative stops, and requires only disclosure of a name rather than production of documents or unspecified “reliable” identification.
- Requests for identification are a standard part of investigative stops and may serve officer-safety and investigative interests, including confirming or dispelling suspicion.
- The Fifth Amendment privilege applies only when compelled disclosure presents a real and appreciable risk of self-incrimination; stating one’s name ordinarily does not trigger the privilege absent a specific showing of incrimination risk.
Conclusion
A state may enforce a narrowly drawn stop-and-identify statute during a Terry stop based on reasonable suspicion by requiring a suspect to state his name, and the Fifth Amendment does not bar that requirement absent an articulated, reasonable risk that the name itself would be incriminating.