## Facts

- S. Casey Hill, an Ontario Crown attorney, was publicly accused by Morris Manning (acting for the Church of Scientology of Toronto) of misleading a judge and breaching sealing orders.
- On September 17, 1984, Manning held a press conference on the steps of Osgoode Hall, wearing his barrister’s gown, reading and commenting on a notice of motion to commence criminal contempt proceedings against Hill.
- The contempt allegations were later found to be completely untrue and without foundation.
- Hill sued Manning and the Church for libel based on the press conference statements and their republication by the media.
- At trial, a jury found Manning and the Church jointly liable for general damages, and found the Church additionally liable for aggravated and punitive damages.
- The Ontario Court of Appeal largely upheld the judgment; the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, arguing the common law of defamation conflicted with freedom of expression and that damages were excessive.

## Issues

1. Whether the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms directly applies to a private defamation action, and if not, how Charter values affect the common law of defamation.
2. Whether Canadian defamation law should adopt a New York Times v. Sullivan–style “actual malice” rule for speech about public officials or public figures.
3. Whether the defendants’ press conference statements were protected by qualified privilege.
4. Whether the general, aggravated, and punitive damages were so excessive as to warrant appellate intervention or offend freedom of expression.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal and upheld liability and the damages awards.
- The Charter did not directly apply because the dispute was private litigation without governmental action; however, Charter values inform incremental development of the common law.
- The Court held Canadian defamation law generally struck an appropriate balance between protecting reputation and protecting freedom of expression, and declined to adopt an “actual malice” requirement.
- The press conference was not a privileged occasion; qualified privilege did not apply because the publication was directed broadly to the public and media rather than to recipients with a corresponding duty or interest.
- The damages, while high, were not so inordinately large as to be wholly erroneous or based on an error in principle.

## Legal Principles

- The Charter’s direct application is limited to governmental action; in private disputes, Charter values may shape common-law rules but do not create direct Charter causes of action.
- Defamation law protects reputation as a value closely connected to dignity and privacy; courts may balance this protection with freedom of expression without importing U.S. constitutional standards.
- Canadian law does not require public officials to prove “actual malice” to recover for defamation; the Court refused to shift Canadian defamation doctrine to that model.
- Qualified privilege applies only where the speaker has a legal, social, or moral duty to communicate with recipients having a corresponding interest; broad publication to the public at large ordinarily falls outside the privilege.
- Appellate intervention in jury defamation damages is reserved for awards that are wholly erroneous or reflect an error in principle; punitive damages may be sustained to denounce and deter malicious, oppressive, and high-handed conduct.

## Conclusion

The Court affirmed defamation liability arising from a highly public press conference that advanced baseless allegations against a Crown attorney, held the Charter operates indirectly through Charter values in common-law development rather than directly in private litigation, rejected an “actual malice” rule, denied qualified privilege, and upheld substantial general, aggravated, and punitive damages.


Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 (Can.)