## Facts

- Cynthia Jo Hill, former Wyoming Superintendent of Public Instruction, publicly opposed and litigated the constitutionality of Senate File 104 (SF104), a law restricting the superintendent’s authority; SF104 was later invalidated by the Wyoming Supreme Court.
- Timothy M. Stubson, a Wyoming legislator who supported SF104, ran for the U.S. House of Representatives in 2016.
- During the campaign, Stubson made statements criticizing Hill’s performance in office, including assertions that she committed “many illegal acts” while serving as superintendent and that those acts were known but not publicized.
- Hill sued Stubson alleging defamation per se and seeking injunctive relief.
- After the case was reassigned to Judge Thomas T.C. Campbell, Hill moved to disqualify him for cause based on his prior adverse rulings in related SF104 litigation and resulting public criticism; another judge denied the motion for lack of facts showing personal bias.
- Hill filed an amended complaint identifying two occasions of allegedly defamatory statements.
- The district court dismissed under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), concluding the complaint did not allege facts sufficient to satisfy the First Amendment “actual malice” requirement.

## Issues

1. Whether Hill was required to plead actual malice because the challenged campaign speech concerned a public official’s conduct in office.
2. Whether the amended complaint stated a plausible claim for defamation per se under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) in light of the constitutional fault requirement.
3. Whether the denial of Hill’s motion to disqualify the assigned trial judge for cause was error.

## Decision

- The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding Hill was at least a public official as to statements about her official conduct and therefore had to plead actual malice.
- The court affirmed on reasoning different from the district court’s articulation, concluding the amended complaint did not allege nonconclusory facts permitting a plausible inference that Stubson spoke with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth.
- The court assumed for analysis that the alleged accusations could fit traditional defamation per se categories, but held that did not relieve Hill of pleading constitutionally required actual malice.
- The court affirmed denial of disqualification, holding that adverse prior rulings and controversy over earlier decisions did not show personal bias or prejudice.

## Legal Principles

- When allegedly defamatory statements concern a public official’s performance or misconduct in office and are made in a political campaign context, the plaintiff must plead and prove actual malice (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth).
- Defamation per se classifications do not eliminate the First Amendment fault requirement in cases involving public officials or matters of public concern.
- Under Rule 12(b)(6), courts accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true but disregard conclusory assertions; pleading actual malice requires factual content supporting a reasonable inference of the defendant’s state of mind.
- Judicial disqualification for cause requires facts showing personal bias or prejudice; adverse rulings and public reaction to prior decisions, without more, are insufficient, and judges generally must sit absent valid grounds for recusal.

## Conclusion

The Wyoming Supreme Court held that campaign statements criticizing a former superintendent’s official conduct triggered the actual-malice pleading requirement and affirmed dismissal because the complaint alleged conclusions rather than facts supporting knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard; it also affirmed denial of judicial disqualification because prior adverse rulings and associated controversy did not establish personal bias.


Hill v. Stubson, 420 P.3d 732 (Wyo. 2018)