## Facts

- HL sued the Attorney General of Canada and a federal employee for sexual battery arising from two incidents that occurred about 20 years earlier, when HL was about 14 years old, on a Saskatchewan reserve where the employee worked for the federal government.
- At trial, HL led evidence (including HL’s testimony and evidence from two experts) linking the abuse to long-term psychological harm and major life impacts, including alcoholism, emotional problems, criminal involvement, and an unstable employment history.
- The evidence included that HL left school around age 17 without completing Grade 8, was unable to maintain meaningful employment for long periods, and later worked only sporadically.
- The trial judge found the sexual abuse was a significant cause of HL’s poor employment record and related difficulties.
- The trial judge held the federal Crown vicariously liable and awarded:
  - non‑pecuniary damages;
  - pecuniary damages for past and future loss of earning capacity (loss of earnings); and
  - pre‑judgment interest.
- On future loss, the trial judge did not have precise proof of what HL would earn in the future, but used HL’s past earnings and the overall record to estimate future earnings and resulting loss.
- The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal disagreed with parts of the trial judge’s factual assessment and concluded the evidence did not support the pecuniary award for past and future loss of earnings; it set that award aside.
- HL appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, arguing the Court of Appeal exceeded its proper role by revisiting factual findings and the damages assessment without meeting the required appellate standard of review.

## Issues

1. What is the proper standard of appellate review for a trial judge’s findings of fact (and closely related assessments) in a civil case?
2. Did the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal err by setting aside the trial judge’s pecuniary damages award for loss of past and future earnings without identifying a palpable and overriding error?
3. Does s. 14 of *The Court of Appeal Act, 2000* (Saskatchewan) permit the Court of Appeal to substitute its own factual conclusions and damages assessment more freely than the common law standard allows?

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Canada allowed HL’s appeal in substantial part.
- The Court held that appellate review of findings of fact is highly deferential: the Court of Appeal could intervene only if the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error.
- The Court concluded the Court of Appeal improperly revisited the evidentiary record and substituted its own view of the facts and damages analysis, rather than identifying a reviewable error meeting that standard.
- The Court restored the trial judge’s pecuniary damages award for loss of earning capacity (subject to any adjustments specified in the reasons), and addressed related questions about the appellate court’s remedial authority and the role of s. 14.

## Legal Principles

- Appellate courts owe substantial deference to trial judges on findings of fact, including credibility assessments, causal findings drawn from the record, and fact-driven components of damages analysis.
- The standard for reviewing findings of fact is “palpable and overriding error”: the error must be obvious and must have affected the result.
- Disagreement with a trial judge’s weighing of evidence is not enough; an appeal is not a re-trial on the record.
- Damages for loss of earning capacity, particularly future loss, often cannot be proven with exact precision. A trial judge may make reasonable estimates and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence (including past earnings and the overall record) when direct future-earnings proof is unavailable.
- A provincial statute describing appellate powers (including s. 14 of Saskatchewan’s *Court of Appeal Act, 2000*) does not remove the common law constraint that factual findings may be disturbed only on the palpable and overriding error standard.
- Parliamentary debates (Hansard) may assist in understanding statutory context and purpose, but they generally carry limited weight compared with the text, scheme, and object of the legislation.

## Conclusion

*HL v. Canada (Attorney General)* confirms that appellate courts must not reweigh evidence or redo a trial judge’s fact-based damages assessment unless they can point to a palpable and overriding error; applying that rule, the Supreme Court found the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal went too far in setting aside the trial judge’s pecuniary award for loss of earning capacity arising from sexual abuse and restored the award subject to the Court’s stated adjustments.


HL v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 25 (2005)