## Facts

- A special federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania investigated multiple suspected federal crimes, including frauds on the United States, customs and narcotics violations, liquor-tax offenses, white-slave traffic violations, perjury, bribery, and conspiracies.
- Hoffman was subpoenaed and appeared before the grand jury.
- Hoffman refused to answer questions about his present occupation and whether he had been doing the same work since the beginning of the year.
- Hoffman answered that he knew William Weisberg but refused to answer questions about when he last saw Weisberg, whether he had communicated with him recently, and whether he knew Weisberg’s current location.
- It was stipulated that Hoffman refused to answer on the ground that his responses might tend to incriminate him of a federal offense.
- Hoffman had been publicly described as an underworld figure with a lengthy police record, including a narcotics-related prison sentence.
- The refused questions concerned Hoffman’s occupation and his contacts with, and knowledge about, a witness sought by the grand jury, for whom process was being pursued.

## Issues

1. Whether the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protects a grand-jury witness’s refusal to answer questions that are not facially incriminating but may create a risk of federal prosecution in context.
2. What standard governs judicial evaluation of whether answering may present a real danger of self-incrimination.
3. Whether Hoffman’s refusal to answer questions about his occupation and about his contacts with and knowledge of a sought witness could constitutionally support a criminal contempt conviction.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed and set aside Hoffman’s criminal contempt conviction.
- The Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege extends to answers that would not themselves establish guilt but could supply a link in the chain of evidence toward a federal prosecution.
- The Court ruled that a witness need not demonstrate the precise manner of incrimination; it is enough if, from the implications of the questions in their setting, responsive answers or an explanation for refusing could be dangerous.
- Applying that contextual standard, the Court concluded Hoffman’s fear of self-incrimination was reasonable as to both his occupation and his association with the sought witness, and the lower courts erred in compelling answers and punishing refusal.

## Legal Principles

- The Fifth Amendment privilege protects against compelled disclosures that would directly support a conviction and against compelled disclosures that would furnish a link in the chain of evidence for a federal crime.
- A claim of privilege is sustained when it is evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that answering (or explaining a refusal) might lead to injurious disclosure.
- Courts decide whether the privilege applies, but must evaluate the claim with attention to context and without requiring the witness to prove incrimination in a way that would force disclosure of the very facts the privilege protects.
- In a broad criminal investigation, questions about a witness’s “business” or associations may be privileged when truthful answers could expose the witness to prosecution for federal offenses, including offenses connected to assisting or concealing a sought witness.

## Conclusion

The Court held that a grand-jury witness may invoke the Fifth Amendment when answers could reasonably contribute to federal prosecution, even if the questions appear innocuous in isolation, and reversed a contempt conviction where the lower courts failed to account for the contextual danger of self-incrimination.


Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951)