Facts
- Congress criminalized knowingly providing “material support or resources” to a designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO) under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, incorporating definitions including “training,” “expert advice or assistance,” “service,” and “personnel.”
- The Secretary of State designated the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as FTOs based on involvement in terrorist violence, while also engaging in political and humanitarian activity.
- A U.S. nonprofit, other U.S. organizations, and U.S. citizens sought to provide only lawful, nonviolent assistance to PKK and LTTE members, including training on human-rights advocacy, instruction on using international law to resolve disputes peacefully, legal assistance for petitions to international bodies, and support for peace negotiations.
- Respondents alleged their planned activities risked prosecution because they would provide “training,” “expert advice or assistance,” “services,” or “personnel” to FTOs.
- The district court enjoined parts of § 2339B as applied to respondents, finding certain terms unconstitutionally vague; the Ninth Circuit affirmed in relevant part.
- The Supreme Court reviewed the as-applied constitutional challenges.
Issues
- Whether § 2339B’s terms “training,” “expert advice or assistance,” “service,” and “personnel” are unconstitutionally vague as applied to respondents’ proposed conduct under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.
- Whether applying § 2339B to respondents’ proposed, nonviolent, peace-oriented advice and instruction coordinated with FTOs violates the First Amendment rights of speech and association.
Decision
- The Supreme Court reversed the injunction and upheld § 2339B as applied to respondents’ proposed activities in a 6–3 decision.
- The Court held the challenged terms were not unconstitutionally vague as applied, given statutory definitions and limiting constructions.
- The Court held the statute’s application to coordinated advocacy and assistance performed in concert with, or under the direction of, an FTO did not violate the First Amendment, even assuming strict scrutiny applied.
- The Court distinguished protected independent advocacy about an FTO from prohibited coordinated support directed to, or done in coordination with, the FTO.
Legal Principles
- An as-applied vagueness challenge fails where statutory terms, as defined and applied, give adequate notice of prohibited conduct and provide sufficiently clear enforcement standards.
- “Training” may be treated as instruction designed to impart a specific skill rather than general knowledge.
- “Expert advice or assistance” may be limited to advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.
- “Personnel” may be limited to individuals working under the direction or control of an FTO; independent advocacy remains outside the prohibition.
- The First Amendment permits prohibiting coordinated speech and association that function as “material support” to an FTO, based on the government’s compelling interests in combating terrorism and preventing support from conferring fungible resources or legitimacy.
- The statute does not bar independent advocacy, public speech, or commentary supporting an FTO’s cause in the abstract; it bars providing certain forms of coordinated support to the organization itself.
Conclusion
The Court held that Congress may criminalize providing defined forms of “material support,” including coordinated training and specialized advice, to designated foreign terrorist organizations without violating due process or the First Amendment, while leaving independent advocacy and public expression protected.