## Facts

- Eunice Hollins, a Black woman, worked as a machine operator at Atlantic’s Willoughby Hills, Ohio facility.
- Atlantic maintained written grooming and appearance policies requiring women to have “neat and well groomed” hair and stating standards applied to everyone.
- In 1994, Hollins wore “finger waves” and was told by supervisors the style was unacceptable because it was “too different” and “eye catching,” despite testimony that it was neat and safe.
- In 1995, a plant manager required Hollins to submit a photograph of any proposed hairstyle change for preapproval; a proposed style was rejected.
- In 1996, Hollins wore a ponytail and was told it was “too drastic,” reminded of the preapproval requirement, and warned noncompliance could affect performance reviews and “lead to termination”; she reverted to an approved style but was still admonished.
- The record indicated at least five White female employees supervised by the same decisionmakers wore ponytails repeatedly without objection.
- Hollins filed a race discrimination charge with the OCRC/EEOC in 1996.
- In 1997, Hollins again wore a ponytail; a new foreman (aware of her prior charge) and others agreed hairstyles should not “call attention” to the employee, and Hollins was told her ponytail was unacceptable for that reason and warned to consider other employment if hair was important to her.
- Hollins sued under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and Ohio law for disparate treatment, and under Title VII for retaliation; the district court granted summary judgment to Atlantic on both theories.

## Issues

1. Whether Hollins produced sufficient evidence to create a triable issue and establish a prima facie case of race-based disparate treatment based on allegedly selective enforcement of facially neutral grooming standards.
2. Whether Hollins produced sufficient evidence of a materially adverse employment action and causal connection to her OCRC/EEOC charge to establish a prima facie retaliation claim.

## Decision

- The Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment on the disparate treatment claims and remanded for further proceedings.
- The court held the record permitted a reasonable jury to find Hollins was treated differently than similarly situated White employees through heightened scrutiny, subjective disapproval, and a special preapproval restriction.
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Atlantic on the retaliation claim.
- The court held Hollins did not show a materially adverse employment action causally linked to the protected activity.

## Legal Principles

- Disparate treatment claims under Title VII and § 1981 may be proven through the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework when direct evidence is lacking.
- A plaintiff’s prima facie case requires protected status, qualification, an adverse employment action, and less favorable treatment than similarly situated nonprotected employees.
- “Adverse employment action” is not limited to hiring, firing, or demotion; it may include other materially adverse changes in the terms or conditions of employment, assessed in context.
- Facially neutral grooming policies can support liability if applied more strictly to employees because of race, including through subjective standards and selective enforcement against a protected employee.
- For retaliation, protected activity and employer knowledge are insufficient without a materially adverse action and evidence connecting that action to the protected activity.

## Conclusion

The court allowed Hollins’s race discrimination claims to proceed because evidence of comparator tolerance, heightened monitoring, and a unique preapproval requirement could be viewed as materially adverse and selectively imposed based on race, but it rejected her retaliation claim for lack of a materially adverse action tied to her discrimination charge.


Hollins v. Atl. Co., 188 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 1999)