## Facts

- Mary Hollomon worked for Dr. W. R. Keadle, a physician, in his medical office for slightly over two years and resigned voluntarily.
- Hollomon alleged Keadle repeatedly cursed at her and used degrading slurs and sexual insults directed at her.
- She alleged Keadle made sexist statements about women generally and denigrated women in the office, including his wife.
- Hollomon alleged “veiled threats,” including statements that he had criminal “connections,” could pay someone to “take care of” a person, and that a former employee “supposedly” died in a car accident.
- She also alleged Keadle claimed to carry a gun and said he had pulled it on a patient, which she interpreted as intimidation.
- Hollomon claimed emotional and physical symptoms (stomach problems, sleep loss, anxiety), took medication provided by Keadle and another physician, and contacted a counselor.
- The record did not show Keadle was made aware that Hollomon was unusually susceptible to emotional distress or that she was suffering distress so severe that a reasonable person could not be expected to endure it.
- Hollomon stated she stayed in the job despite early awareness of Keadle’s temperament because she was a poor, single parent and feared retaliation.

## Issues

1. Whether, taking Hollomon’s allegations as true, the evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to establish the tort of outrage (intentional infliction of emotional distress) and thereby preclude summary judgment for Keadle.

## Decision

- The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for Keadle.
- The court held Hollomon’s allegations did not satisfy the stringent requirements for the tort of outrage in the employment context.
- The court treated the sufficiency of the alleged facts to state outrage as a threshold legal question; absent a legally sufficient claim, disputed facts were not material.

## Legal Principles

- Outrage (IIED) requires proof that: (1) the defendant intended to cause emotional distress or knew/should have known it was likely; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous and utterly intolerable in a civilized community; (3) causation; and (4) distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.
- Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; in outrage cases, courts first decide whether the allegations, if true, state a claim.
- Arkansas applies a restrictive approach to outrage claims arising from employment relationships and affords employers substantial latitude in managing employees.
- A plaintiff’s case is weakened where the defendant lacked notice that the plaintiff was peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress or lacked notice that the alleged distress reached the required level of severity.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed dismissal because the alleged profanity, degrading insults, and implied threats—though offensive—did not, on this record, meet Arkansas’s narrow outrage standard or show that the employer had notice of distress so severe that a reasonable person could not be expected to endure it.


Hollomon v. Keadle, 326 Ark. 168, 931 S.W.2d 413 (Ark. 1996)