## Facts

- Clifford Holmquist was injured in a roadway accident while driving a truck for his employer.
- Holmquist pursued workers’ compensation benefits and testified under oath at a hearing before the Maine Workers’ Compensation Board.
- At the board hearing, Holmquist stated that another truck caused the accident and then left the scene, preventing identification of the driver or vehicle.
- Holmquist carried a personal automobile policy issued by Farm Family Casualty Insurance Company that included uninsured-motorist coverage and a “hit and run” provision for injuries caused by an unidentified negligent driver.
- Holmquist later died, making him unavailable to testify in later proceedings.
- Deborah Holmquist, acting as personal representative of Holmquist’s estate, made a claim for uninsured-motorist benefits under the policy’s hit-and-run coverage based on Holmquist’s account of a phantom vehicle.
- Farm Family denied the claim, asserting that there was no admissible evidence that any unidentified vehicle caused the accident.
- Deborah sued Farm Family in federal court, and Farm Family moved for summary judgment on the ground that the estate lacked admissible proof of a hit-and-run vehicle.

## Issues

1. Whether Holmquist’s sworn testimony from the Maine Workers’ Compensation Board hearing could be used in the coverage suit (despite his death) under an exception to the hearsay rule, including the former-testimony exception.
2. Whether, viewing the admissible record in the light most favorable to the estate, a reasonable factfinder could find that an unidentified negligent driver caused the accident so that hit-and-run uninsured-motorist coverage could apply.

## Decision

- The court denied Farm Family’s motion for summary judgment.
- The court determined that Holmquist’s prior sworn testimony from the workers’ compensation hearing could be considered in the coverage litigation under the rules governing hearsay exceptions for an unavailable declarant.
- With that testimony in the record, the court held there was a genuine dispute of material fact on whether an unidentified truck caused the accident and fled the scene.
- Because that factual dispute went to a key element of the estate’s hit-and-run uninsured-motorist claim, the court ruled the claim could not be resolved as a matter of law at the summary-judgment stage.

## Legal Principles

- Summary judgment is inappropriate where admissible evidence would allow a reasonable factfinder to resolve a material fact in the nonmovant’s favor.
- Under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1), testimony given at a prior hearing may be admissible when the declarant is unavailable and the party against whom it is offered (or, in a civil case, a qualifying predecessor in interest) had an opportunity and a similar motive to develop the testimony.
- Prior sworn testimony from an administrative adjudicatory hearing can qualify as “former testimony” when the hearing provided examination procedures and the testimony was developed under oath.
- In an uninsured-motorist hit-and-run dispute, evidence that a phantom vehicle caused the accident typically presents a fact question when the record contains competent proof supporting that account.

## Conclusion

The district court held that Farm Family was not entitled to summary judgment because the estate could rely on Holmquist’s sworn workers’ compensation hearing testimony (given his unavailability after death) to support the claim that an unidentified truck caused the accident; that evidence created a genuine dispute of material fact as to hit-and-run uninsured-motorist coverage, requiring the case to proceed beyond summary judgment.


Holmquist v. Farm Family Casualty Insurance Co., 800 F. Supp. 2d 305 (2011)