## Facts

- A local branch of a far-right political party planned a public meeting in Munich and advertised an appearance by David Irving, publicly associated with denial of the Nazi persecution and extermination of Jews.
- The City of Munich, acting under the Assembly Act, permitted the event but imposed a condition requiring the organizer to ensure that statements denying or casting doubt on the persecution of Jews under National Socialism would not be made.
- The condition directed the organizer to warn attendees at the outset that such statements could be criminal, to stop such contributions immediately, and, if necessary, to interrupt or end the event.
- The city justified the condition based on a high probability that crimes such as incitement and related offenses would occur in light of the invitation and the planned speaker.
- Administrative courts upheld the condition, and further review was denied.
- The organizer filed a constitutional complaint alleging violations of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly.

## Issues

1. Whether denial of the Nazi persecution and extermination of Jews is protected speech as an opinion under constitutional freedom of expression.
2. Whether authorities may impose assembly conditions aimed at preventing such denial when criminal offenses are expected.
3. Whether a content-focused condition on an otherwise permitted meeting violates constitutional freedom of assembly.

## Decision

- The constitutional complaint was dismissed as manifestly unfounded.
- The Court held the challenged measures did not violate freedom of expression because Holocaust denial, as presented, was a factual assertion contradicting historically and judicially established facts.
- Because dissemination of proven false factual assertions lies outside the scope of constitutional free-speech protection, the assembly condition targeting such statements was constitutionally permissible.
- The Court found no separate violation of freedom of assembly because the meeting was not prohibited; the condition addressed only unprotected speech and served to prevent anticipated criminal conduct.

## Legal Principles

- Freedom of expression broadly protects value judgments and opinions, regardless of their worth or offensiveness, but it does not extend to proven false or knowingly untrue factual assertions.
- A statement is treated as a factual assertion when its core concerns an objectively verifiable claim about reality, rather than a subjective evaluation.
- Denial of the Nazi persecution and extermination of Jews was classified as a demonstrably false factual assertion given extensive historical evidence and repeated judicial findings.
- Because proven false factual assertions do not fall within free-speech protection, general laws (including criminal law and assembly law) may restrict or prevent their dissemination.
- Assembly conditions may lawfully target specific unprotected statements when necessary to avert expected offenses, without amounting to an unconstitutional restriction of the assembly itself.

## Conclusion

The Court upheld preventive assembly conditions aimed at stopping Holocaust denial, reasoning that denial of the Nazi persecution and extermination of Jews constitutes a proven false factual assertion outside constitutional free-speech protection, and that limiting such unprotected speech at a permitted public meeting does not violate constitutional guarantees of expression or assembly.


Holocaust Denial Case (Auschwitzlüge), 90 BVerfGE 241 (F.C.C. 1994)