## Facts

- Fred Honaker owned a house in the Village of Lovington, Illinois, which was not his primary residence and was in poor condition due to ongoing remodeling.
- Gary Smith was both the Village’s elected mayor and the fire chief.
- A fire destroyed Honaker’s house.
- Honaker alleged Smith (1) caused the fire and/or (2) used his official authority to ensure the house would not be saved by failing to use proper firefighting efforts.
- Honaker also alleged that Smith engaged in harassment and intimidation before and after the fire, causing Honaker severe emotional distress.
- Honaker sued Smith in federal court asserting (a) federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations and (b) an Illinois common-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on allegations that a state actor caused the fire and/or deliberately failed to extinguish it in violation of substantive due process.
2. Whether the district court erred by granting judgment as a matter of law on Honaker’s Illinois IIED claim.

## Decision

- The court affirmed judgment as a matter of law for Smith on the § 1983 claims, leaving no federal constitutional liability.
- The court reversed judgment as a matter of law for Smith on the IIED claim and remanded for further proceedings.
- The court held the evidence did not permit a reasonable jury to find a constitutional violation under substantive due process standards.
- The court held the IIED claim presented a jury question under Illinois law based on evidence of alleged harassment and resulting severe distress.

## Legal Principles

- Section 1983 provides a vehicle to enforce federal rights; it does not create substantive rights, and liability requires proof of a deprivation of a federal constitutional or statutory right.
- Substantive due process liability for executive action requires conduct that is sufficiently egregious to “shock the conscience”; negligence, poor judgment, or ordinary failures in providing public services generally do not meet that standard.
- A § 1983 property-deprivation theory premised on an official’s intentional destruction requires evidence supporting intentional, state-driven conduct; speculation and stacked inferences are insufficient.
- Under Illinois law, IIED requires (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent to cause distress or reckless disregard of the probability of causing distress, and (3) severe emotional distress.
- When reasonable jurors could differ on whether conduct is extreme and outrageous and whether severe distress occurred, IIED should not be removed from the jury by judgment as a matter of law.

## Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit held that the evidence could not support a finding that the mayor/fire chief committed a substantive due process violation actionable under § 1983, but it concluded the record was sufficient for a jury to decide whether the same course of alleged harassment and intimidation constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress under Illinois law, requiring reversal and remand on that state-law claim.


Honaker v. Smith, 256 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2001)