## Facts

- George C. Hook, a Chicago attorney, was indicted in federal court with Carmen Viana for alleged theft from an employee pension plan, wire fraud, and money laundering.
- Viana fled to Brazil; Hook’s criminal case proceeded without her.
- Before the criminal case, Viana and Wittek Industries were defendants in an ERISA civil suit in which Hook represented them and later submitted a $10,000 fee bill to their insurer.
- The insurer disputed the amount and hired a law firm to review the bill; Judge Joe Billy McDade’s wife, Mary McDade, worked at that firm and reviewed Hook’s charges.
- The insurer paid 75% of Hook’s bill; Hook withdrew from representing Wittek and Viana on appeal.
- Hook claimed Mary McDade questioned whether his withdrawal near the appellate-brief deadline could be malpractice.
- Hook’s criminal case was assigned to Judge McDade, who denied several pretrial motions (including motions to dismiss and to transfer venue).
- Hook moved for Judge McDade’s recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455; Judge McDade denied the motion and stated on the record that he was offended by the motion as an attack on his integrity.
- On the eve of trial, Hook petitioned the Seventh Circuit for a writ of mandamus compelling recusal.

## Issues

1. Whether Hook met the requirements for mandamus relief to compel a district judge’s recusal.
2. Whether recusal was required under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) because the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned based on the judge’s spouse’s prior fee-review role.
3. Whether recusal was required under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) for personal bias or prejudice based on the spouse’s alleged “malpractice” comment, the judge’s adverse rulings, or the judge’s on-record reaction to the recusal motion.

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit denied the petition for a writ of mandamus.
- The court held that Judge McDade was not required to recuse under § 455(a) or § 455(b)(1).
- The court concluded the spouse’s involvement was limited to reviewing a fee bill in earlier civil litigation and was too attenuated to create an objective appearance of partiality in the criminal case.
- The court found that adverse judicial rulings did not establish disqualifying bias, and the judge’s offended reaction to the recusal request did not show deep-seated antagonism making fair judgment impossible.
- Because Hook lacked a clear and indisputable right to recusal, mandamus was inappropriate; any claim of unfairness could be addressed through ordinary appellate review.

## Legal Principles

- Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only in exceptional circumstances; the petitioner must show a clear and indisputable right to relief and no adequate alternative remedy.
- Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), the question is whether a well-informed, thoughtful observer would perceive a significant risk that the judge will decide the case on a basis other than the merits; trivial or speculative risks do not justify disqualification.
- Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1), recusal requires a genuine showing of personal bias or prejudice (or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts), not dissatisfaction with court rulings.
- Judicial rulings, standing alone, almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion absent deep-seated favoritism or antagonism.
- A judge’s irritation or offense when responding to accusations in a recusal motion, without more, does not establish disqualifying bias.

## Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit refused to compel recusal by mandamus because the asserted connections—limited prior work by the judge’s spouse in an insurer’s fee review, unfavorable pretrial rulings, and the judge’s defensive remarks—did not create an objective appearance of partiality or demonstrate personal bias under § 455.


Hook v. McDade, 89 F.3d 350 (7th Cir. 1996)