## Facts

- Yvonne S. Cosden created a revocable trust in 1993, later amended and restated, providing that at her death it would become irrevocable.
- The trust directed that Christopher E. Cosden (the settlor’s son) receive the net income from the trust principal during his lifetime, distributed incrementally at least quarterly.
- Upon Christopher Cosden’s death, the trust principal was to be distributed outright in shares to three named institutions of higher education.
- The trust contained a spendthrift clause barring beneficiaries from pledging, assigning, or otherwise transferring their interests and limiting use of trust income and principal to beneficiaries’ personal benefit.
- After the settlor’s death in 2010, Joseph J. Horgan and Christopher Cosden became successor cotrustees.
- In 2015, Christopher Cosden and the remainder beneficiaries agreed to terminate the trust early and distribute assets using a present-value allocation that would give Cosden a lump sum for his lifetime income interest and distribute the remainder interests immediately.
- Horgan refused to consent, asserting early termination would contradict the settlor’s plan for protected lifetime income and delayed remainder distributions.
- Christopher Cosden petitioned to terminate the trust and implement the beneficiaries’ agreement; the trial court granted summary judgment for Cosden and ordered termination and distribution.

## Issues

1. Whether an irrevocable spendthrift trust may be judicially terminated early based on unanimous consent of all income and remainder beneficiaries when termination would conflict with the settlor’s material purposes expressed in the trust instrument.
2. Whether the presence of a spendthrift clause and a structured lifetime-income plan establishes a material purpose that bars beneficiary-compelled termination.
3. Whether perceived economic benefits (reduced administrative costs, avoidance of market risk) can justify early termination despite conflict with settlor intent.

## Decision

- The appellate court reversed the judgment terminating the trust.
- The court held early termination would defeat material purposes of the trust, including providing a protected, incremental lifetime income interest and preserving principal for distribution to the remainder beneficiaries at the son’s death.
- Unanimous beneficiary consent did not authorize termination where it would contradict those material purposes.
- The court concluded there were no genuine issues of material fact and that Horgan was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
- The case was remanded with instructions to enter final summary judgment for Horgan denying termination of the trust.

## Legal Principles

- The settlor’s intent, as expressed in the trust language, governs trust administration and questions of termination.
- Beneficiaries may not terminate a trust by consent if termination would conflict with a material purpose of the trust.
- A spendthrift provision is strong evidence of a material purpose to restrict alienation and prevent acceleration of enjoyment of trust assets.
- A trust structure providing incremental lifetime income to one beneficiary with a remainder to others at a specified time reflects a material purpose to control the timing and form of distributions.
- Courts may not approve early termination based solely on beneficiary advantage or administrative efficiency when doing so would override the settlor’s expressed plan.

## Conclusion

The court ruled that an irrevocable spendthrift trust creating a protected lifetime income stream with a delayed remainder distribution cannot be terminated early by unanimous beneficiary agreement when termination would frustrate the settlor’s material purposes, and it directed entry of summary judgment denying termination.


Horgan v. Cosden, 249 So. 3d 683 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2018)