## Facts

- A dispute arose over ownership of all or part of five subdivision lots in Timberleigh Village, Howard County, Maryland.
- The Martins claimed ownership and contracted to sell the lots to the Hornings, developers/builders constructing homes on the lots.
- The Hardys asserted competing ownership under their deeds and, alternatively, by adverse possession for more than twenty years.
- The Hardys, through counsel, notified the Martins, the Hornings, and transaction participants that the Hardys claimed title and intended to pursue litigation.
- On the day a home sale was scheduled to close, the Hardys’ attorney informed closing participants that suit asserting the Hardys’ ownership had been filed; the sale did not close.
- The Hardys sued in trespass and ejectment seeking possession and damages.
- The Hornings counterclaimed against the Hardys for injurious falsehood/slander of title and malicious interference with contract, seeking compensatory and punitive damages.
- The Hornings also pursued a cross-claim against the Martins based on the Martins’ special warranty of title.

## Issues

1. Whether the Hardys proved ownership of the disputed property by deed or by adverse possession sufficient to recover in trespass and ejectment.
2. Whether the Hardys’ communications asserting their title claim to interested parties constituted actionable injurious falsehood/slander of title or malicious interference, or were protected by a conditional privilege.
3. If a conditional privilege applied, whether the Hardys forfeited it by constitutional malice (knowing falsity or reckless disregard) or by common-law malice (spite or ill-will).

## Decision

- The appellate court held the Hardys failed to establish superior title by deed or adverse possession and therefore could not prevail on their trespass/ejectment claims.
- The court held the Hardys’ statements and actions in asserting their claim of title and notifying interested persons were conditionally privileged.
- The court found no sufficient showing that the Hardys acted with knowing falsity, reckless disregard for truth, or spite/ill-will; the privilege was not abused.
- As a result, the Hornings could not recover against the Hardys for injurious falsehood/slander of title or malicious interference based on the privileged communications.

## Legal Principles

- A claimant asserting adverse possession must prove open, notorious, exclusive, hostile, and continuous possession for the statutory period; failure to prove the required elements defeats the claim.
- In a title dispute, a party must prevail on the strength of its own title, not the weakness of an opponent’s.
- Communications made in good faith by a person with an interest in the subject to others with a corresponding interest may be protected by a conditional (qualified) privilege.
- The existence of a conditional privilege is a question of law for the court; whether the privilege was abused or forfeited by malice is for the trier of fact.
- Conditional privilege may be lost by proof of constitutional malice (knowing falsity or reckless disregard for truth) or common-law malice (spite or ill-will).
- Adoption of a negligence standard for defamation does not eliminate the defense of conditional privilege.
- For slander of title/injurious falsehood, liability requires proof that the defendant knowingly made false statements, or acted with the requisite fault, and that the plaintiff suffered resulting pecuniary loss.

## Conclusion

The court denied the Hardys’ effort to obtain the property because they failed to prove superior title, including the elements of adverse possession, and it also rejected tort liability against them because their good-faith assertion of a competing title claim and related notices to interested parties were conditionally privileged and not shown to be malicious.


Horning v. Hardy, 36 Md. App. 419, 373 A.2d 1273 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977)