Hough & Kershaw v. The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865)

Facts

  • Hough & Kershaw owned a wharf on the Chicago River, along with large warehouses (packing houses) built on or alongside the wharf and filled with valuable goods.
  • The Falcon, a steam propeller used in Great Lakes commerce, was anchored at the wharf on waters treated as admiralty waters.
  • Through the negligence of the Falcon’s crew, a fire started aboard the vessel.
  • The fire spread from the Falcon to the wharf, then to the warehouses and the goods stored there, destroying the structures and their contents.
  • Hough & Kershaw filed a libel in federal district court seeking to proceed in admiralty against the owners of the Falcon.
  • Because the Falcon was not seized, Hough & Kershaw attached a different vessel owned by the same owners, the Plymouth (a sister ship), as the res in the in rem admiralty action.
  • The district court dismissed the libel for lack of admiralty jurisdiction; the circuit court affirmed; Hough & Kershaw sought review in the Supreme Court.

Issues

  1. Does federal admiralty jurisdiction cover a tort claim for damage to land-based property (a wharf, warehouses, and stored goods) caused by a fire that began on a vessel located on navigable waters?

Decision

  • The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal for want of admiralty jurisdiction.
  • Admiralty tort jurisdiction depends on the place where the injury is completed.
  • Because the damage complained of—the burning of the wharf, warehouses, and goods—occurred wholly on land, the case was not within admiralty, even though the fire began on the vessel.
  • In tort cases, admiralty jurisdiction is determined by the locality of the injury, not the locality of the negligent act.
  • When the injury or damage is done wholly upon land, the fact that the cause originated on waters within admiralty jurisdiction does not make the claim a maritime tort.
  • The presence of a vessel as the instrument that started the harm does not supply admiralty jurisdiction if the damage is land-based.
  • Statutes extending admiralty jurisdiction to Great Lakes waters expand the geographic reach of admiralty waters, but they do not convert purely land damage into an admiralty tort.
  • A plaintiff cannot create admiralty jurisdiction by attaching a vessel in rem when the underlying tort, as measured by where the damage occurred, is not maritime.

Conclusion

The Court held that federal admiralty courts lacked jurisdiction over Hough & Kershaw’s claim because the injury they sued for was the destruction of land-based structures and goods; the fact that the fire began aboard the Falcon on navigable waters did not make the tort maritime, so the admiralty libel against the attached vessel Plymouth was properly dismissed.