## Facts

- Doreen Houseman and Eric Dare were engaged, cohabited for about thirteen years, jointly bought a home (1999), and jointly bought and registered a pedigree dog (2003).
- In May 2006, Dare ended the relationship and sought to keep the home and buy out Houseman’s interest; Houseman deeded her interest to him in June 2006.
- Houseman moved out on July 4, 2006, taking the dog and its belongings, while leaving some items as mementos for Dare.
- Houseman alleged an oral separation agreement: she would keep the dog and Dare would keep the house while paying her for her share of the equity.
- After the separation, the dog lived with Houseman; Dare periodically visited and took the dog out.
- Houseman left the dog with Dare while she traveled; upon her return, Dare refused to return the dog.
- Houseman sued for specific performance of the alleged oral agreement and for a declaration that she owned the dog; the parties stipulated the dog’s intrinsic value was $1,500.
- Other pleaded claims (including conversion, emotional distress, and house-equity misrepresentation) were resolved or abandoned and were not part of the appeal.

## Issues

1. Whether an oral agreement between former cohabitants allocating ownership and possession of a dog may be specifically enforced.
2. Whether a court may categorically deny specific performance solely because a pet is classified as personal property.

## Decision

- The Appellate Division affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
- It held the trial court erred by treating the dog’s status as personal property as a per se bar to specific performance.
- It ruled that specific performance may be available for an enforceable agreement concerning a pet when damages are inadequate and equity otherwise supports the remedy.
- It remanded for reconsideration of the appropriate remedy under the correct legal standards, rather than limiting relief to the stipulated $1,500 value.

## Legal Principles

- Specific performance may be ordered for breach of an enforceable agreement when money damages are inadequate to protect the injured party’s expectation interest and an order to perform would not be inequitable, reward unfair dealing, or conflict with public policy.
- Personal property can warrant specific performance when it has special subjective value to the promisee such that damages do not provide an adequate substitute.
- Pets are classified as personal property, but that classification does not categorically preclude equitable relief, including specific performance, when traditional factors justify it.
- Agreements between cohabitants concerning jointly held property are material in disputes over division and may be specifically enforced when equitable requirements are satisfied.
- Courts need not apply a “best interests of the animal” custody standard to resolve ownership disputes over pets.

## Conclusion

The court held that an enforceable cohabitants’ agreement allocating a dog may be specifically enforced if damages are inadequate and equitable factors favor that remedy, and it remanded because the trial court incorrectly barred specific performance as a matter of law based solely on the dog’s classification as property.


Houseman v. Dare, 405 N.J. Super. 538, 966 A.2d 24 (App. Div. 2009)