## Facts

- Two adjoining office-building tracts were originally part of a single 7.1414-acre parcel.
- The north tract (2.7264 acres) was developed with a two-story, 50,000-square-foot office building (“Corporate Plaza 1”).
- The south tract (4.4150 acres) was later developed with a second office building (“Corporate Plaza 2”).
- Rather than build separate access for the south tract, the developers widened an existing driveway located entirely on the north tract and used that driveway and portions of north-tract parking to serve both buildings.
- A successor to Houston Bellaire acquired the north tract through foreclosure in 1986.
- In 1996, TCP negotiated to buy the south tract and requested a cross-easement agreement to secure continued access and parking use across the north tract; Houston Bellaire refused, proposed fencing the boundary, and offered a lease for access instead.
- TCP purchased the south tract; in 1997, Houston Bellaire began building a fence that would block the shared use.
- TCP sued seeking a declaration of an easement (by estoppel, implication, prescription, and necessity) and asserted tortious-interference claims; it obtained a temporary injunction stopping fence construction.
- The trial court granted summary judgment against TCP on easement by estoppel, tried the remaining easement theories to the bench, and awarded TCP an easement by implication, a permanent injunction barring the fence, and attorney’s fees and costs; it denied other relief.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence supported the “unity of ownership” element for an easement implied from prior use when the tracts were held by separate but related development entities at the time of severance.
2. Whether an apparent, continuous, and existing quasi-easement (shared driveway/parking) existed at the time the tracts were severed.
3. Whether the trial court applied the correct necessity standard—reasonable necessity rather than strict necessity—for an easement implied from prior use.
4. Whether the trial court properly awarded attorney’s fees to TCP and denied fees to Houston Bellaire under the Texas Declaratory Judgments Act.
5. Whether summary judgment against TCP on easement by estoppel (and denial of TCP’s cross-motion) was proper.

## Decision

- The court of appeals affirmed the judgment granting TCP an easement by implication over the north tract’s driveway/parking and affirmed the permanent injunction preventing Houston Bellaire from fencing in a manner that would obstruct the easement.
- The court held the record supported unity of ownership based on substantially common beneficial ownership and control despite formal title in different entities.
- The court upheld the finding that the shared use was apparent, continuous, and in existence at the time of severance because the widened driveway and shared parking were visible and used to serve the south building.
- The court held that reasonable necessity is the correct standard for an implied easement based on prior use and concluded the shared access and parking were reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the south tract.
- The court affirmed the attorney’s-fees award to TCP and denial of fees to Houston Bellaire as within the trial court’s discretion under the Declaratory Judgments Act.
- The court affirmed the summary-judgment rulings rejecting TCP’s easement-by-estoppel theory.

## Legal Principles

- An easement implied from prior use requires: (1) unity of ownership followed by severance; (2) an apparent, continuous, and permanent use of one part for the benefit of another at the time of severance; and (3) reasonable necessity for the dominant estate’s enjoyment.
- “Unity of ownership” may be shown by substantially common beneficial ownership and control, not merely by formal title in identical legal entities.
- For an implied easement based on prior use, the necessity element is “reasonable necessity”; strict necessity is associated with easements by necessity, not prior-use implied easements.
- Visible, continuous use of a driveway and parking serving both parcels can satisfy the “apparent and existing use at severance” requirement.
- Under the Texas Declaratory Judgments Act, attorney’s fees may be awarded as equitable and just; fee awards are reviewed for abuse of discretion, and a prevailing declaratory-judgment claimant may recover fees even if other claims fail.
- An easement by estoppel requires proof of a definite representation and reasonable, detrimental reliance; failure to conclusively establish those elements supports summary judgment against the claimant.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed an implied easement allowing the south-tract owner to use the north tract’s driveway and parking because the parcels were developed under common control with an apparent, continuous shared-use arrangement that was reasonably necessary at severance; it also upheld injunctive relief and discretionary attorney’s fees while rejecting an easement-by-estoppel theory.


Houston Bellaire, Ltd. v. TCP LB Portfolio I, L.P., 981 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.)