## Facts

- Hudson owned a close in the City of London adjoining premises owned by Nicholson and others.
- Timber shores and supports for the defendants’ building extended in, upon, and over Hudson’s close.
- The supports had been placed before Hudson acquired the close.
- During Hudson’s possession, the defendants wrongfully kept and continued the supports on his land for a long time.
- Hudson requested removal of the supports, but the defendants did not remove them.
- Hudson alleged he could not safely remove the supports himself without causing the defendants’ building to fall.
- Hudson claimed the continued encroachment deprived him of use and enjoyment of the close and prevented him from erecting a dwelling-house and other buildings, causing loss of rents and profits.

## Issues

1. Whether, after a plaintiff’s verdict, a declaration that substantively alleges a trespass to land is sufficient even though it is framed as an action on the case for consequential injury and omits the traditional allegation of *vi et armis*.
2. Whether a person who acquires land after an encroaching structure is first placed may sue for the continued keeping of that structure on the land during the person’s possession.

## Decision

- The court upheld the plaintiff’s verdict and rejected the post-verdict attack on the declaration’s sufficiency.
- A declaration stating a wrong that is, in substance, the subject of trespass is treated as a good count in trespass after verdict, despite omission of *vi et armis* and case-like drafting focused on consequential harm.
- The continued keeping of the supports on the plaintiff’s land during his possession supported liability for an ongoing invasion of possessory rights.

## Legal Principles

- After verdict, courts sustain pleadings that, in substance, state a cause of action; technical defects in form, including omission of *vi et armis* and mislabeling as “case,” are not fatal where the pleaded facts amount to trespass.
- A direct physical encroachment onto land (placing or maintaining objects in, upon, or over another’s close) constitutes trespass, even when the plaintiff pleads consequential losses (loss of use, inability to build) flowing from the invasion.
- A continued encroachment maintained during the plaintiff’s possession is actionable by the person in possession at the time of the continuing invasion, even if the encroachment began before that person acquired the land.

## Conclusion

The court sustained a plaintiff’s verdict where the pleading, though styled as case and lacking *vi et armis*, alleged facts amounting to a direct and continuing trespass to land by the defendants’ supports encroaching onto the plaintiff’s close, actionable by the current possessor.


Hudson v. Nicholson, 151 Eng. Rep. 185 (Exch. 1839)