## Facts

- Maryland created a program to remove abandoned, inoperable automobiles (“hulks”) by paying a state “bounty” to licensed scrap processors that destroyed them.
- Under the original program, processors could claim bounties without submitting title documentation.
- A 1974 amendment required documentation and imposed different requirements based on processor location:
  - Processors with a plant in Maryland could qualify using an “indemnity agreement” from an unlicensed supplier certifying entitlement and agreeing to indemnify the processor.
  - Out-of-state processors had to submit a certificate of title, a police certificate vesting title, or a bill of sale from a police auction.
- Alexandria Scrap Corp., a Virginia processor that had participated in the program, alleged that the new requirements reduced its access to bounty-eligible hulks from Maryland sources.
- Alexandria Scrap sued Maryland officials, arguing the amendment discriminated against interstate commerce and denied equal protection.
- A three-judge federal district court granted summary judgment to Alexandria Scrap and enjoined Maryland from limiting the indemnity-agreement option to in-state processors.

## Issues

1. Whether Maryland’s bounty program, as amended to impose heavier documentation requirements on out-of-state processors, violated the Commerce Clause by impermissibly burdening or discriminating against interstate commerce.
2. Whether the differing documentation requirements for in-state versus out-of-state processors violated the Equal Protection Clause.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the injunction and upheld the amended program.
- The Court held the Commerce Clause was not violated because Maryland was acting as a market participant by spending state funds to purchase the destruction of hulks and could prefer in-state processors in distributing that benefit.
- The Court held the Equal Protection Clause was not violated because the classification had a rational basis tied to Maryland’s objectives and administrative concerns.

## Legal Principles

- When a state enters the market as a buyer or seller, rather than regulating private conduct, it may favor its own citizens in its commercial dealings without triggering the same dormant Commerce Clause limits that apply to protectionist regulation.
- A state program that does not bar interstate movement of goods, but instead structures eligibility for state payments, is less likely to be treated as a Commerce Clause trade barrier when the state is acting as a participant.
- Differential treatment based on in-state versus out-of-state status in an economic program is reviewed under rational basis when no suspect classification or fundamental right is implicated.
- Administrative and anti-fraud considerations, including difficulties verifying transactions beyond the state’s borders, can supply a rational basis for more demanding documentation requirements for out-of-state participants.

## Conclusion

The Court upheld Maryland’s hulk-bounty documentation scheme, reasoning that the state was participating in the market by allocating state funds and could favor in-state processors, and that the differing paperwork requirements for out-of-state processors were rationally related to legitimate administrative and program-integrity goals.


Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976)