## Facts

- During a theft trial involving an IBM typewriter, defense attorney Henry E. Hughes was called as a witness concerning how the stolen typewriter was returned to police.
- Hughes testified that an unidentified person contacted and employed him to arrange the property’s return without involving Hughes as a witness.
- Hughes contacted a senior police officer and arranged for the typewriter to be left anonymously on Hughes’s front porch, after which police retrieved it.
- When asked in open court to identify the person who employed him, Hughes refused, asserting attorney–client privilege over the client’s identity.
- The trial judge ordered Hughes to answer; upon continued refusal, the judge adjudged Hughes in contempt and imposed punishment.
- Hughes filed an original petition in the Kentucky Court of Appeals seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the contempt order.

## Issues

1. Whether attorney–client privilege protected Hughes from disclosing the identity of the person who employed him to arrange the return of stolen property.
2. Whether the trial judge exceeded his authority by compelling the answer and punishing refusal as contempt, warranting prohibition.

## Decision

- The court denied the writ of prohibition.
- The court held the attorney–client privilege did not extend to the client’s identity on this record.
- The court concluded the trial judge acted within his authority in ordering disclosure and enforcing compliance through contempt.

## Legal Principles

- Attorney–client privilege protects confidential communications made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or legal services, not every fact associated with representation.
- The identity of a client and the fact of employment are generally not privileged, even if disclosure may be embarrassing or incriminating.
- A narrow exception may apply when revealing the client’s identity would effectively disclose the substance of a confidential legal communication; the party claiming the privilege must show that disclosure is inseparable from protected communications.
- Prohibition is an extraordinary remedy aimed at preventing clear jurisdictional overreach; it is not a substitute for ordinary review of alleged trial-court error within the court’s jurisdiction.

## Conclusion

Because disclosure of the caller’s name would not, by itself, reveal a confidential legal communication, the attorney–client privilege did not bar the question, and the trial judge’s contempt order for refusal to answer was enforceable; extraordinary relief by prohibition was therefore unavailable.


Hughes v. Meade, 453 S.W.2d 538 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970)