## Facts

- David E. Hughley was a park police officer trainee expected to become an officer after training and probation; mounted (horse) training was part of the program.
- Hughley had a longstanding fear of horses tied to past trauma, producing anxiety and physical symptoms that interfered with mounted training.
- After Hughley reported illness and sought treatment, a psychiatrist recommended that he be excused from mounted training.
- A superior referred Hughley to psychologist Dr. Michael T. McDermott for evaluation of suitability for mounted training.
- Hughley signed a written authorization permitting McDermott to disclose to a superior “Diagnosis and Recommendations for the purpose of suitability for mounted training.”
- McDermott evaluated Hughley briefly and later issued written reports to Hughley’s superiors.
- The reports allegedly stated that Hughley fabricated complaints, was “malingering,” and had a manipulative, possibly pathological character, including a comparison that only criminals lied as brazenly.
- The police department terminated Hughley’s trainee employment, relying at least in part on McDermott’s reports.
- Hughley sued McDermott for defamation based on the reports.

## Issues

1. Whether Hughley’s written authorization to disclose “Diagnosis and Recommendations” created an absolute privilege (via consent) barring the defamation claim as a matter of law.
2. Whether the statements describing Hughley as malingering, manipulative, and criminal-like in dishonesty were capable of defamatory meaning (as opposed to nonactionable opinion).
3. Whether any qualified privilege applicable to employment-related psychological communications was abused (e.g., by malice, excess beyond scope, or reckless disregard for truth).
4. Whether summary judgment was proper given disputes and competing inferences on material facts.

## Decision

- The court vacated summary judgment for McDermott and remanded for trial.
- Consent did not establish absolute privilege as a matter of law because factual questions existed about the scope of Hughley’s authorization and whether the reports exceeded it.
- The statements were capable of defamatory meaning because a jury could read them as factual accusations of dishonesty and manipulative conduct harmful to Hughley’s reputation and employment.
- Even if a qualified privilege applied to communications made for an employer’s fitness evaluation, the record permitted a finding of abuse, making the issue for the fact-finder.
- Under Maryland’s summary judgment standard, disputed facts and reasonable inferences had to be resolved against the movant, precluding judgment as a matter of law.

## Legal Principles

- Summary judgment is improper where material facts are disputed or where differing reasonable inferences exist; the court may not resolve credibility, intent, or meaning issues reserved for the fact-finder.
- Consent-based protection for publication depends on the scope of the consent; whether a communication stayed within a limited authorization can present a factual question.
- Professional evaluative communications may be defamatory if they convey provably true-or-false accusations (e.g., dishonesty or manipulation) rather than mere clinical impressions or protected opinion.
- Employment-related communications made in furtherance of a shared interest may be conditionally privileged, but the privilege can be lost if the publisher acts with malice, recklessness, or exceeds the purpose and scope of the privilege.

## Conclusion

The court held that Hughley’s defamation claim could not be dismissed on summary judgment because the scope of consent, the defamatory character of the psychologist’s statements, and whether any conditional privilege was abused were matters for a jury to decide.


Hughley v. McDermott, 72 Md. App. 391, 530 A.2d 13 (Ct. Spec. App. 1987)