## Facts

- Hull (plaintiff) owned land adjoining Orynge’s (defendant’s) land in Devon.
- Along the boundary was a hedge of thorns growing on Orynge’s side.
- Orynge cut the thorns on his own land, and some cuttings fell onto Hull’s land inadvertently (“ipso invito,” against his will).
- Orynge entered Hull’s close to remove the fallen thorns.
- In entering and removing the cuttings, Orynge trampled Hull’s grass and damaged vegetation.
- Hull brought trespass (*quare vi et armis clausum fregit*) for breaking his close and for the resulting damage to grass/crops.
- Orynge justified the entry by pleading that (1) the cutting was lawful on his own land, (2) the fall onto Hull’s land was accidental, and (3) he entered promptly only to retrieve his thorns.
- Hull challenged the legal sufficiency of that justification; although later summaries describe an initial ruling for Orynge, the King’s Bench ultimately entered judgment for Hull.

## Issues

1. Whether a landowner who lawfully cuts thorns on his own land may enter a neighbor’s land to retrieve cuttings that accidentally fell there, without committing trespass for the entry and the trampling damage.
2. Whether, in an action of trespass, the defendant avoids liability by showing the act was lawful and the damage unintended, or whether he must also show the harm was unavoidable despite proper care.

## Decision

- Judgment for the plaintiff (Hull).
- The court treated Orynge’s plea of justification as insufficient: the lawfulness of cutting on one’s own land and the accidental fall did not, by themselves, excuse entry onto the neighbor’s close that caused damage.
- The justices distinguished criminal fault from civil trespass: absence of malice may matter for felony, but it does not necessarily bar an action for trespass when a plaintiff suffers physical damage from another’s act.
- In the form commonly drawn from the report and later summaries, Orynge could avoid liability only by showing that he could not have done the act without the thorns falling (or that he did all he could to prevent the harm). Without such a showing, he had to answer for the damage caused.

## Legal Principles

- A person who does an act is bound to do it so that no harm or damage comes to others through that act; if damage occurs, an action may lie even though the initial act was lawful.
- In trespass, unintended harm can be actionable when it flows directly from the defendant’s voluntary conduct and results in physical damage to land or vegetation.
- The lawfulness of the defendant’s “principal” conduct on his own land does not automatically create a privilege to enter the plaintiff’s land or to cause damage there while correcting the consequences.
- To rely on “accident” as a justification in trespass, the defendant must plead facts showing the harm was not avoidable (for example, that he took proper care or could not do otherwise); a bare claim that the harm was against his will is not enough.
- Civil trespass is not limited to intentionally inflicted harm; lack of wrongful purpose does not by itself defeat liability for direct physical injury to another’s close.

## Conclusion

In *Hull v. Orynge* (the “Case of the Thorns”), the King’s Bench held that a defendant could be liable in trespass when, after lawfully cutting thorns on his own land, the cuttings accidentally fell onto a neighbor’s land and the defendant entered to retrieve them, trampling the neighbor’s grass; lawfulness and lack of intent did not, without more, excuse the entry or the resulting damage.


Hull v. Orynge, Y.B. 6 Edw. 4, 7a, pl. 18 (K.B. 1466)