## Facts

- Federal law long required airlines to ensure passenger and carry-on screening, typically by contracting with private screeners.
- Huntleigh USA Corporation provided passenger and baggage screening at dozens of U.S. airports under renewable, multi-year contracts with multiple airlines and invested in workforce and checkpoint infrastructure.
- After the September 11, 2001 attacks, Congress enacted the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), creating the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and shifting screening responsibility from airlines and private contractors to the federal government.
- During a transition period, private screeners continued operating while TSA hired and deployed federal screeners; afterward, TSA was to become the exclusive screening provider.
- Huntleigh alleged that federalization caused its airline contracts to be cancelled or to expire without renewal and destroyed its going-concern value and goodwill in the airport-screening business.
- Huntleigh sued the United States in the Court of Federal Claims asserting: (1) a Fifth Amendment taking of its contracts, goodwill, and going-concern value; and (2) a statutory right to “adequate compensation” under ATSA § 101(g).
- The 2005 rulings addressed jurisdiction and the sufficiency of the pleadings, not final liability or damages.

## Issues

1. Whether ATSA’s transfer of airport-screening functions to TSA could support a compensable Fifth Amendment taking claim, or instead was categorically non-compensable as an exercise of police power.
2. Whether Huntleigh’s airline screening contracts and associated business goodwill/going-concern value constituted cognizable “property” for Takings Clause purposes rather than non-compensable expectations of future business.
3. Whether the heavily regulated nature of aviation security defeated Huntleigh’s asserted property interests as a matter of law at the pleading stage.
4. Whether ATSA § 101(g)’s “adequate compensation” language is money-mandating and enforceable in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act.

## Decision

- The Court of Federal Claims declined to dismiss the Fifth Amendment takings claim at the pleading stage, holding that Huntleigh alleged enough to proceed to factual development.
- The court ruled that the national-security and public-safety purpose of ATSA did not, by itself, foreclose a takings claim as a matter of law on a motion to dismiss.
- The court treated Huntleigh’s contracts and alleged destruction of goodwill/going-concern value as sufficiently concrete property interests to survive dismissal, subject to proof.
- The court held that ATSA § 101(g) was sufficiently money-mandating to support Tucker Act jurisdiction over Huntleigh’s statutory compensation claim.
- The court emphasized that takings determinations are fact-dependent and required a fuller record.

## Legal Principles

- A Takings Clause claim generally cannot be resolved solely by labeling government action as an exercise of police power; application of takings doctrine depends on the specific facts and the nature of the interference with identified property interests.
- Contract-based interests and associated business goodwill may, in some circumstances, qualify as “property” for takings purposes; whether they are compensable depends on the character and effect of the government action.
- In regulatory contexts, the existence of pervasive regulation may affect the scope of reasonable investment-backed expectations, but it does not necessarily defeat a takings claim as a matter of law at the pleading stage.
- Statutory language directing payment of “adequate compensation” can be treated as money-mandating for Tucker Act jurisdiction when it reflects congressional intent to require monetary relief rather than confer unfettered discretion.

## Conclusion

The Court of Federal Claims allowed Huntleigh to proceed past dismissal on both a Fifth Amendment takings theory and a statutory compensation theory under ATSA § 101(g), holding that the police-power purpose of federalizing airport screening did not automatically bar relief and that the asserted property interests and compensation statute warranted factual development before final adjudication.


Huntleigh USA Corp. v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 440 (Fed. Cl. 2005)