## Facts

- Indigent criminal defendants in five New York counties (Washington, Onondaga, Ontario, Schuyler, and Suffolk) brought a putative class action against the State and state officials for declaratory and injunctive relief.
- Plaintiffs did not seek to overturn convictions; they alleged ongoing, systemic failures in the provision of indigent defense attributable to the State’s structure for meeting its right-to-counsel obligations.
- New York’s indigent defense services were largely administered and funded at the county level under local rules and practices, with limited statewide oversight.
- Plaintiffs alleged that indigent defendants were sometimes arraigned without counsel and, in other instances, were assigned counsel who was unavailable, unresponsive, or unprepared.
- The complaint also alleged chronic underfunding, excessive caseloads, lack of training and supervision, inadequate investigation, and minimal attorney-client contact.
- Trial court denied the State’s motion to dismiss; the Appellate Division reversed and dismissed, reasoning that right-to-counsel claims must be pursued through postconviction ineffective-assistance remedies.
- The Court of Appeals reviewed on an interlocutory appeal from a dismissal motion.

## Issues

1. Whether indigent defendants may bring a preconviction civil class action for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief based on alleged systemic, constructive denial of the right to counsel.
2. Whether arraignment is a “critical stage” requiring counsel, even when guilty pleas are not taken at arraignment.
3. Whether allegations of systemic deprivation of counsel can be adjudicated without impermissibly drawing courts into legislative funding and resource-allocation decisions.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated core portions of the complaint, remitting for further proceedings.
- The court held that the complaint sufficiently stated a claim for constructive denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, distinct from ordinary ineffective-assistance claims focused on individual attorney errors.
- The court held that arraignment is a critical stage because pretrial liberty (including bail and detention) is regularly decided then, and counsel is necessary to protect fair-trial rights.
- The court rejected the view that such claims must await postconviction review and held that prospective declaratory and injunctive relief may be available to prevent ongoing violations.
- A dissent would have affirmed dismissal, emphasizing postconviction remedies and concerns about judicial manageability and resource oversight.

## Legal Principles

- A civil, preconviction action may lie where plaintiffs plausibly allege systemic, constructive denial of counsel, rather than case-specific claims of deficient attorney performance.
- Arraignment is a critical stage of criminal proceedings requiring the assistance of counsel, even if pleas are not taken at that appearance, because liberty and downstream trial-related interests are affected.
- The constitutional right to counsel is not satisfied by appointment of counsel “in name only”; meaningful representation must be available at critical stages.
- Courts may adjudicate whether indigent defense systems meet constitutional minimum requirements and may consider prospective remedies to prevent ongoing deprivation of counsel.

## Conclusion

The court permitted indigent defendants to pursue prospective classwide relief based on alleged systemic, constructive denial of counsel and held that the absence of counsel at arraignment can itself state a right-to-counsel violation because arraignment is a critical stage where liberty and fair-trial interests are at stake.


Hurrell-Harring v. State, 15 N.Y.3d 8 (N.Y. 2010)