## Facts

- John and Effie Lowks owned approximately ninety-four acres of land that included a roadway running from a public road into and across the larger tract.
- In 1912, John and Effie Lowks conveyed forty acres to William Lowks.
- The 1912 deed described and conveyed the forty-acre parcel and, in the same conveyance, included “also a road” that bisected the ninety-four-acre tract and functioned as the route to reach the conveyed forty acres.
- The 1912 deed required John Lowks to keep both sides of the road fenced and to keep the road open “without a gate.”
- Over time, the forty-acre tract came to be owned by the Hursts (plaintiffs-appellants), and the remaining fifty-four acres came to be owned by Baker (defendant-appellee).
- The Hursts filed suit seeking a declaration that, under the 1912 deed, they owned the roadway in fee simple.
- Baker answered that the roadway was not conveyed in fee and that, at most, the parties held rights of passage (a shared easement) rather than fee ownership by the forty-acre tract.
- The Gallia County Court of Common Pleas ruled for Baker, concluding that the 1912 conveyance did not transfer fee title to the roadway and that Baker owned the roadway, with the Hursts holding only an easement interest.
- The Hursts appealed.

## Issues

1. Did the 1912 deed language conveying the forty-acre tract “also a road,” together with the fence/no-gate obligations, convey fee simple title to the roadway to the grantee (and thus to the Hursts), rather than merely granting an easement?

## Decision

- The Ohio Court of Appeals, Fourth Appellate District, reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded.
- The court of appeals concluded that the 1912 deed conveyed fee simple title to the roadway to the grantee of the forty-acre parcel, so the Hursts (as successors) owned the roadway in fee.
- The case was returned to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s construction of the deed.

## Legal Principles

- The primary goal in construing a deed is to determine the parties’ intent, and the deed must be read as a whole.
- Interpretation of an unambiguous deed is a question of law reviewed on appeal without deference to the trial court’s legal construction.
- Deed language that conveys land and, as part of the conveyance, includes “also a road” may indicate an intent to convey the road itself as a strip of land (fee title), not merely a right of passage.
- Maintenance-related provisions—such as requiring fencing along both sides of the road and requiring that it remain open “without a gate”—can support the reading that the road was treated as a defined part of the conveyance, not simply a shared use right.

## Conclusion

In *Hurst v. Baker*, the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed a trial court decision that had treated a roadway referenced in a 1912 deed as merely an easement and had awarded fee ownership of the road to the owner of the retained tract. Reading the deed as a whole, the appellate court held that the conveyance of forty acres “also a road,” along with the fence and no-gate requirements, showed an intent to transfer fee simple title to the roadway to the grantee and therefore to the Hursts as successors, and it remanded for proceedings consistent with that holding.


Hurst v. Baker, 1997 WL 215767 (1997)