## Facts

- Stanley Papierz, Theresa Papierz, and Stanley Papierz Builders, Inc. entered into a real-estate joint venture with Robert Rauth involving the Villa Venice West apartment property.
- Rauth claimed a 30% interest in the venture and alleged the Papierz parties wrongfully and fraudulently denied that interest for years, excluded him from management and profits, and refused to account.
- Earlier in the litigation, the appellate court ruled that Rauth was entitled to relief based on his 30% joint-venture interest and sent the case back to the circuit court with directions to grant specified relief and to enter any further relief that was just and equitable.
- On remand, the circuit court entered a decree recognizing Rauth’s 30% interest and used equitable remedies to protect that interest while sorting out the venture’s finances.
- The circuit court appointed a receiver to manage/preserve the joint-venture property and arranged for an accounting to determine what amounts were due to Rauth.
- The Papierz parties appealed from the post-remand decree, challenging whether the circuit court’s remedy went beyond the mandate and whether the accounting could be handled through a referral to a master/fee officer or similar delegate rather than by the judge.

## Issues

1. Whether, after remand, the circuit court had authority to order equitable relief—such as appointing a receiver and requiring an accounting—to carry the prior appellate mandate into effect.
2. Whether the circuit court could delegate the taking and stating of the accounting to a master in chancery, fee officer, or outside accountant, rather than conducting the accounting in court.

## Decision

- The appellate court held that the circuit court had authority on remand to enter remedial orders consistent with the mandate, including an accounting and the appointment of a receiver to protect the venture assets and Rauth’s 30% interest.
- The appellate court approved the use of receivership in light of the prior findings of wrongful conduct and the need to preserve property and income while the parties’ financial rights were determined.
- The appellate court held that, although an accounting was proper, it could not be referred out for determination in a way that displaced the judge’s role in deciding disputed matters; the accounting had to be conducted by the trial court.
- Disposition: affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings (especially as to the method of conducting the accounting).

## Legal Principles

- On remand, the trial court must implement the reviewing court’s mandate and may enter additional orders needed to carry it out when the mandate authorizes further just and equitable relief.
- “Law of the case” bars relitigation of issues already decided in earlier stages of the same case, but it does not prevent trial-court remedial steps that are consistent with the prior decision and needed to effectuate it.
- In equity, an accounting is an appropriate remedy when one joint venturer has been excluded from management and profits and the financial dealings must be examined to determine amounts owed.
- Appointment of a receiver is an extraordinary remedy, but it is permissible where necessary to preserve property, prevent diversion or dissipation of assets, and protect the rights recognized by the court.
- A trial court may not delegate core judicial decision-making in a contested accounting to a master/fee officer in a manner inconsistent with constitutional or structural limits; disputed accounting issues must be determined by the judge.

## Conclusion

Hurst v. Papierz addressed the remedies available after a remand in a joint-venture dispute where Rauth had been wrongfully denied a 30% interest: the appellate court approved the circuit court’s use of a receiver and an accounting to protect and implement Rauth’s rights under the earlier mandate, but required that the accounting be conducted by the trial court rather than delegated to a master or similar officer, and therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.


Hurst v. Papierz, 16 Ill. App. 3d 574 (1973)