## Facts

- Several Black students, including Vernon Hysaw, attended Washburn University of Topeka and played football on athletic scholarships for the 1986–87 academic year.
- Each plaintiff signed a written financial-aid agreement that guaranteed payment of specified scholarship funds but did not promise participation in athletics or continued membership on the football team.
- Early in the 1986 football season, the players complained to university officials that the coaching staff and administration treated Black players in a racially discriminatory manner.
- After continuing disputes, the players boycotted team practices.
- Washburn removed the plaintiffs from the football team following the boycott.
- Washburn nevertheless paid each plaintiff the full amount of scholarship funds promised for the 1986–87 year.
- Plaintiffs sued Washburn and several university officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (due process and First Amendment theories), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (race discrimination), and state-law breach of contract, claiming the scholarships and related promises gave them a right to play football.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment, and the parties also litigated motions concerning sanctions.

## Issues

1. Whether the written scholarship/financial-aid agreements created a constitutionally protected property interest in playing intercollegiate football, such that removing plaintiffs from the team required due process under § 1983.
2. Whether removal from the team implicated a constitutionally protected liberty interest (such as reputational harm plus a legal disability) requiring due process under § 1983.
3. Whether defendants violated the First Amendment (via § 1983) by removing plaintiffs from the team in retaliation for complaints about racial discrimination and related expressive activity.
4. Whether plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence of intentional race discrimination to proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 based on their removal from the team.
5. Whether removing plaintiffs from the team breached the scholarship agreements under state contract law, where the agreements promised financial aid but did not state a right to play football.
6. Whether sanctions were warranted based on the parties’ conduct in the litigation.

## Decision

- The court granted summary judgment for defendants on the due process property-interest claim, holding the written financial-aid agreements promised payment of scholarship funds—not participation in football—and plaintiffs received the promised funds.
- The court granted summary judgment for defendants on the due process liberty-interest claim, finding no showing of the kind of stigma plus a state-imposed burden on future opportunities required to establish a protected liberty interest.
- The court granted summary judgment for defendants on the breach-of-contract claim, concluding the written scholarship documents did not contractually guarantee the right to play football and alleged oral assurances could not create a contractual term contrary to the written agreements.
- The court denied summary judgment on the § 1981 race-discrimination claim, concluding that disputes of fact about motive and differential treatment prevented resolution as a matter of law.
- The court denied summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation theory under § 1983, concluding that factual disputes about protected activity and causation required a trial determination.
- The court addressed the parties’ sanctions requests and did not impose broad sanctions that would dispose of claims.

## Legal Principles

- A Fourteenth Amendment property interest exists only when a plaintiff has a legitimate entitlement created by contract, statute, or rule; a unilateral expectation of continued participation in athletics is not enough.
- A scholarship agreement that guarantees only financial assistance, and is fully paid, does not create a due process property interest in playing intercollegiate football or remaining on a team.
- A due process liberty interest generally requires reputational harm plus a concrete government-imposed disability (stigma-plus); removal from a team, without more, does not meet that standard.
- When a written contract is unambiguous and does not promise athletic participation, courts generally enforce the written terms and do not treat alleged oral statements as adding a right to play football.
- A § 1981 claim requires evidence from which a factfinder could conclude that race motivated the challenged action affecting the making, performance, or enforcement of a contract; disputes about discriminatory intent commonly preclude summary judgment.
- A First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983 requires protected activity and a causal link to adverse action; where motive and causation are genuinely disputed, summary judgment is inappropriate.

## Conclusion

Hysaw held that Washburn’s written scholarship agreements did not give Black football players a due process property or contract right to play football, and removal from the team did not establish a due process liberty deprivation; however, factual disputes about discriminatory and retaliatory motive meant the players’ § 1981 and First Amendment § 1983 claims could proceed past summary judgment.


Hysaw v. Washburn University of Topeka, 690 F. Supp. 940 (1987)