Facts
- Several Black students, including Vernon Hysaw, attended Washburn University of Topeka and played football on athletic scholarships for the 1986–87 academic year.
- Each plaintiff signed a written financial-aid agreement that guaranteed payment of specified scholarship funds but did not promise participation in athletics or continued membership on the football team.
- Early in the 1986 football season, the players complained to university officials that the coaching staff and administration treated Black players in a racially discriminatory manner.
- After continuing disputes, the players boycotted team practices.
- Washburn removed the plaintiffs from the football team following the boycott.
- Washburn nevertheless paid each plaintiff the full amount of scholarship funds promised for the 1986–87 year.
- Plaintiffs sued Washburn and several university officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (due process and First Amendment theories), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (race discrimination), and state-law breach of contract, claiming the scholarships and related promises gave them a right to play football.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment, and the parties also litigated motions concerning sanctions.
Issues
- Whether the written scholarship/financial-aid agreements created a constitutionally protected property interest in playing intercollegiate football, such that removing plaintiffs from the team required due process under § 1983.
- Whether removal from the team implicated a constitutionally protected liberty interest (such as reputational harm plus a legal disability) requiring due process under § 1983.
- Whether defendants violated the First Amendment (via § 1983) by removing plaintiffs from the team in retaliation for complaints about racial discrimination and related expressive activity.
- Whether plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence of intentional race discrimination to proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 based on their removal from the team.
- Whether removing plaintiffs from the team breached the scholarship agreements under state contract law, where the agreements promised financial aid but did not state a right to play football.
- Whether sanctions were warranted based on the parties’ conduct in the litigation.
Decision
- The court granted summary judgment for defendants on the due process property-interest claim, holding the written financial-aid agreements promised payment of scholarship funds—not participation in football—and plaintiffs received the promised funds.
- The court granted summary judgment for defendants on the due process liberty-interest claim, finding no showing of the kind of stigma plus a state-imposed burden on future opportunities required to establish a protected liberty interest.
- The court granted summary judgment for defendants on the breach-of-contract claim, concluding the written scholarship documents did not contractually guarantee the right to play football and alleged oral assurances could not create a contractual term contrary to the written agreements.
- The court denied summary judgment on the § 1981 race-discrimination claim, concluding that disputes of fact about motive and differential treatment prevented resolution as a matter of law.
- The court denied summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation theory under § 1983, concluding that factual disputes about protected activity and causation required a trial determination.
- The court addressed the parties’ sanctions requests and did not impose broad sanctions that would dispose of claims.
Legal Principles
- A Fourteenth Amendment property interest exists only when a plaintiff has a legitimate entitlement created by contract, statute, or rule; a unilateral expectation of continued participation in athletics is not enough.
- A scholarship agreement that guarantees only financial assistance, and is fully paid, does not create a due process property interest in playing intercollegiate football or remaining on a team.
- A due process liberty interest generally requires reputational harm plus a concrete government-imposed disability (stigma-plus); removal from a team, without more, does not meet that standard.
- When a written contract is unambiguous and does not promise athletic participation, courts generally enforce the written terms and do not treat alleged oral statements as adding a right to play football.
- A § 1981 claim requires evidence from which a factfinder could conclude that race motivated the challenged action affecting the making, performance, or enforcement of a contract; disputes about discriminatory intent commonly preclude summary judgment.
- A First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983 requires protected activity and a causal link to adverse action; where motive and causation are genuinely disputed, summary judgment is inappropriate.
Conclusion
Hysaw held that Washburn’s written scholarship agreements did not give Black football players a due process property or contract right to play football, and removal from the team did not establish a due process liberty deprivation; however, factual disputes about discriminatory and retaliatory motive meant the players’ § 1981 and First Amendment § 1983 claims could proceed past summary judgment.